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WHY DO LANDLORDS STILL
DISCRIMINATE (AND WHAT CAN
BE DONE ABOUT IT)?
ROBERT

G. SCHWEMM*

1968: "It is the policy of the United States... to provide for
fair housing throughout the United States."'
2003: "Irrationalprejudice is still encountered in real estate
markets.... '
INTRODUCTION: A MEDICAL ANALOGY

Let's say you have a serious, though not life-threatening,
medical condition, such as a non-malignant growth in your back
that causes considerable pain and impairs your ability to walk. At
first, your doctor tells you there is no cure, but then one day, a new
drug specifically designed to eliminate this kind of problem is
approved. You take this drug, but notice no change. With your
doctor's encouragement, you continue to take the drug, hoping that
its cumulative effect will achieve the desired result. Twenty years
go by with no relief. Then, your doctor tells you that a much
stronger version of this drug has been approved, so you begin to
take it as directed. You are now in the nineteenth year of taking
this "improved" version of the drug, but there is still no relief.
Would you change doctors, get a second opinion, insist on
some new approach, or at least stop taking the drug? Or, would
you continue with the same course of action indefinitely? If the
latter, would your friends and family be justified in believing that
you have no hope of a cure and are just going through the motions
without really wanting or expecting to get well?
Now, substitute in this story the United States for the
patient, the problem of racial discrimination in rental housing for
the painful and debilitating ailment,3 and enforcement of the 1968
Copyright 2007 Robert G. Schwemm. Ashland Professor,
University of
Kentucky College of Law. I thank Ruth Baer, Chris Brancart, Mary Davis,
Alex Polikoff, John Relman, and Sarah Welling for their helpful ideas and
comments on this paper.
1. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000); see also infra note 4.
2. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 300 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)

(citing HUD's 2000 national testing study, infra note 6).
3. Others have also analogized racial discrimination to medical disorders.
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
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Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), as amended in 1988, for the supposedly
helpful drug. The analogy is apt because both problems have gone
on essentially unchanged for the past forty years, despite the
administration of a supposed "cure." By now, it is clear not just
that the treatment has failed, but also that there has been a
failure of imagination on the part of both "patient" and "doctor."
Something new must be tried. If we simply go on using the failed
treatment, one has to wonder if we really want to get better - or
deserve to.
This Article is an attempt to start a new conversation about
this issue. It begins with a review of the evidence for the "disease"
of ongoing rental discrimination in Part I. Part II surveys the
record of the legal "cure" (i.e., enforcement of the FHA),
particularly in the two decades since the FHA's 1988 amendments
strengthened its enforcement provisions. Part III provides an
overview of the rental housing market in the United States, and
Part IV reviews what we know - and do not know - about race
discrimination in this market. Part V then tries to identify some
lessons from other fields, such as economics and psychology, that
might help guide the effort to achieve better FHA compliance in
rental opportunities for racial and ethnic minorities.
I. THE DISEASE
A. Rental Discriminationand Its Role in the
Overall Racial DiscriminationProblem
The FHA has prohibited racial and national origin
discrimination in housing for nearly forty years. Most states and
scores of localities have substantially equivalent laws that mirror
the FHA's prohibitions.5 Still, landlords continue to violate these
prohibitions at an astonishing rate.
The most recent nationwide study by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), based on thousands of
paired tests in dozens of metropolitan areas in 2000, showed that,
in rental tests, whites were favored over blacks 21.6% of the time
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 321 (1987)
(describing racial discrimination as "a disease" and arguing that "the illness of

racism infects almost everyone" in the United States and "[aicknowledging
and understanding the malignancy are prerequisites to the discovery of an
appropriate cure").

4. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000)).

5. For a list of the states and localities that currently have such laws, see
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION app. C

(2006). Most of these states and localities have had fair housing laws that
banned race and national origin discrimination since at least the 1980s. See

id. at C-3-6 (listing state and local fair housing laws that were substantially
equivalent to the FHA in 1988).
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The rate of rental
and over Hispanics 25.7% of the time.
discrimination against Hispanics was actually higher than had
been shown in a similar study in 1989, and the 2000 figure for
blacks was down only a few percentage points compared to its
1989 counterpart.!
Furthermore, the 1989 figures were not
significantly different from those revealed in the first of these
nationwide studies, which was done in 1977.8 A co-author of the
1977 study, Professor John Simonson, determined that the 2000
study shows that, annually, rental discrimination against blacks
occurs over 1.6 million times and against Hispanics over 1.1
million times.'
Comparable figures are not available for the late 1960s when
the FHA first went into effect,10 but presumably rental
6. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN
HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 2000 i-iv (2002)
[hereinafter 2000-I STUDY]. Additional phases of this study found similar
rates of rental discrimination against other ethnic minorities. See MARGERY
AUSTIN TURNER & STEPHEN ROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN
HOUSING MARKETS: PHASE 2-ASIANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS iv (2003)

[hereinafter 2000-II STUDY] (reporting that Asians and Pacific Islanders
experienced adverse treatment compared to whites in 21.5% of rental tests);
IN
MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & STEPHEN ROSS, DISCRIMINATION
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: PHASE 3-NATIVE AMERICANS iii (2003)

(reporting that Native Americans experienced consistently unfavorable
treatment compared to whites in 28.5% of rental tests).
7. 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at iii-iv. The 1989 study found that whites
were favored over blacks in 26.4% of rental tests and that whites were favored
over Hispanics in just under 25% of such tests. Id. The 1989 study is
summarized in MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, RAYMOND STRUYK & JOHN YINGER,
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS (1991) [hereinafter 1989
STUDY].
8. 1989 STUDY, supra note 7. The 1977 study is reported in RON WIENK ET
AL., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING MARKETS:

THE HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY (1979).
9. NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE,

2004 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS

REPORT 2-3 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 TRENDS] (on file with author). Professor
Simonson estimated that, annually, there are 1,626,000 instances of rental
discrimination against African Americans (498,000 involving the availability
of apartments, 1,068,000 involving the inspection of apartments, and 60,000
involving agent encouragement), while the total annual figure for sales
discrimination is 193,000. Id. at 3. The comparable figures for Hispanics are
1,178,315 instances of rental discrimination (542,022 involving the availability
of apartments, 381,724 involving the inspection of apartments, 164,399
involving agent encouragement, and 90,170 involving overall cost), while the
total for sales discrimination is 101,258. Id. These totals, added to the some
422,000 instances of housing discrimination against Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders and the 181,000 instances against Native Americans,
produce a total figure of more than 3,700,000 instances of rental and sales
discrimination per year. Id. at 4.
10. Enacted on April 11, 1968, the 1968 FHA's substantive prohibitions
went into effect immediately for some government-assisted housing, but did
not generally apply to private housing until after December 31, 1968. 42
U.S.C. § 3603(a)(2) (2000).
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discrimination rates were even higher then (i.e., some reduction in
discrimination probably occurred in the immediate aftermath of
the FHA's passage). In any event, the HUD studies show that the
rate of illegal race and national origin discrimination in housing
rentals has remained virtually constant in the three decades after
this initial adjustment.
Rental discrimination is, of course, only one part of the overall
housing discrimination picture, although it seems to be the most
intractable part.1 For example, sales testing was also done in
HUD's 2000 study, and, although high levels of sales
discrimination were shown, these levels were not as high as those
for rental discrimination and were substantially lower than the
comparable figures for sales discrimination revealed in the 1989
study. 2 There is also evidence of substantial race and national
origin discrimination in mortgage lending, home insurance, and
other housing-related practices covered by the FHA.1" But, unlike
11. In addition to rental discrimination being more common than sales
discrimination, see supra note 9 and infra notes 12, 48 and accompanying text,
and text accompanying infra notes 69, 80, most people who feel they have been
victimized by housing discrimination cite their experiences in rental
situations. See MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL, DO WE KNOW MORE Now? TRENDS IN
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, SUPPORT AND USE OF FAIR HOUSING LAW 32 (U.S.
Department of Housing & Urban Development 2006) (reporting, based on a
2005 national survey, that about seventy percent of those who thought they
had been victims of housing discrimination "were looking to rent at the time").
12. See 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at iv (reporting that, in sales tests,
whites were favored over blacks 17.0% of the time (vs. 29.0% in 1989) and over
Hispanics 19.7% of the time (vs. 26.8% in 1989)); 2000-II STUDY, supra note 6,
at iv (reporting that, in sales tests, whites were favored over Asians and
Pacific Islanders 20.4% of the time).
13. See, e.g., FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF GREATER BOSTON, THE GAP
PERSISTS: A REPORT ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN THE GREATER
BOSTON HOME MORTGAGE LENDING MARKET 2 (2006) (finding that minority
homebuyers were disadvantaged in forty-five percent of paired tests relating
to mortgages in the greater Boston area in 2005-2006); Press Release,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition, NCRC Files Discrimination
Complaint Against Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corporation Based on
National Mystery Shopping Audit of Mortgage Brokers (June 15, 2006)
(reporting that over one hundred mortgage tests in six metropolitan areas
"illustrate widespread and blatant policies of racially discriminatory lending
practices"); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., ALL OTHER THINGS BEING
EQUAL: A PAIRED TESTING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITUTIONS iii
(2002) (concluding, based on a paired testing study in Chicago and Los
Angeles, that "African American and Hispanic homebuyers face a significant
risk of receiving less favorable treatment than comparable whites when they
visit mortgage lending institutions to inquire about financing options");
MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE 2
(Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore, eds., 1999) (concluding, based on
a review of existing research evidence, that "minority homebuyers in the
United States do face discrimination from mortgage lending institutions");
JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS
OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 63-85 (1995) (recounting evidence of home
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the rental and sales studies, no effort has been made to calculate
national levels for discrimination rates in these areas, and thus
there is no way to gauge the size or trends over time of such rates.
The continuing high degree of noncompliance with the FHA 4
stands in sharp contrast to the experience in other areas of
American life governed by federal civil rights laws. For example,
with respect to public accommodations, it is rare - and therefore
a cause for public outrage - when a hotel or restaurant denies
service to customers on the basis of their race or national origin."
Similarly, in employment, intentional racial discrimination is now
generally seen as indefensible and worthy of immediate corrective
measures. 16 As a result, America's hotels, restaurants, and
workplaces have become far more integrated since the 1960s than
have our residential communities. Housing is the civil rights area
"where the possibility for real change is viewed as most remote."17
mortgage

and

insurance

discrimination);

INSURANCE

REDLINING,

DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS (Gregory D. Squires, ed., 1997) (dealing with home insurance
discrimination).
14. Based on the 1977 study's figures, HUD estimated that at least
2,000,000 instances of illegal sales and rental discrimination based on race or
national origin were occurring every year. See Testimony of HUD General
Counsel John J. Knapp, in 2 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ISSUES IN

HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 107 (1985). Based on the 2000 study's figures, it is
now estimated that at least 3,700,000 instances of such discrimination occur
every year. See supra note 9; see also ABRAVANEL, supra note 11, at ii
(reporting that about seventeen percent of adults in the United States - over
33,000,000 people, based on a total U.S. over twenty-one population of
197,000,000 - "claims to have suffered discrimination at some point when
trying to buy or rent a house or apartment"). See also U.S. DEP'T. OF
COMMERCE, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 1

(2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dpl/2khOO.pdf
(profiling the general demographic characteristics for the United States in
2000).
15. See, e.g., Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Ismail Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair
Housing and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L. J. 841, 905 (2005) (noting
that "Blacks' access to public accommodations - restaurants, hotels, theaters
- is remarkably greater than it was in 1964").
16. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discriminationin Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.
J. 1619, 1619 (1991) (arguing that, by the mid-1970s, the consensus against
racial discrimination in employment had become so strong that "anyone who
would not publicly condemn [such] racial discrimination was outside the
boundary of acceptable political debate," and that the "widespread, overt
discrimination" that was the principal target of Title VII "does not exist
today").
17. John 0. Calmore, Race /ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at
Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1998); see also Rubinowitz & Alsheik,
supra note 15, at 905-07 (noting that "[h]ousing discrimination seems to
remain a largely intractable fact of America social life" and concluding that
"[iun the end, housing discrimination is different from other civil rights
issues"); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND

The John Marshall Law Review

[40:455

In sum, we know that housing discrimination, and
particularly rental discrimination, is uniquely intractable. We
also know that the economic harm caused by housing
discrimination is massive, with an estimated cost running into the
billions of dollars. 8 We know, too, that housing discrimination
continues to be a significant cause of residential segregation, 9 and
that residential segregation is a major national problem, both in
its own right"0 and because it frustrates efforts to integrate
schools, expand job opportunities, reduce urban sprawl, increase
minority homeownership rates, and reduce the huge gaps in
wealth between whites and minorities.2 Finding a "cure" for
rental discrimination, therefore, should be a major national
priority.
II. THE "CURE"OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

The cure was supposed to have been the 1968 Fair Housing
Act, whose initial provision boldly declares that "it is the policy of
the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for
fair housing throughout the United States."" Throughout the

CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 3 (2004) ("Housing was the
last plank in the civil rights revolution, and it is the realm in which we have
experienced the fewest integration gains."); Peter H. Schuck, Judging
Remedies: JudicialApproaches to Housing Segregation,37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 289, 289 (2002) ("Using the law to promote diversity in residential
communities is probably more difficult than promoting it in any other public
policy domain.").
18. See YINGER, supra note 13, at 89-103.
19. See, e.g., id. at 110-24 (discussing the extent of residential segregation
and identifying its causes); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS
83-114 (1993) (discussing the continuing causes of residential segregation).
20. Racial integration was important to the Congress that passed the 1968
FHA. Proponents in both the Senate and the House repeatedly argued that
this law was intended not only to expand housing opportunities for individual
minorities, but also to foster residential integration for the benefit of all
Americans. See, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 2275, 3422 (1968) (remarks of Senator
Mondale, the FHA's principal sponsor). Senator Mondale noted the alienation
of whites and blacks is caused by the 'lack of experience in actually living
next" to each other and contended that the FHA's purpose was to replace the
ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced living patterns." Id. Senator Javits
noted that the law's intended beneficiaries were not only blacks and other
minorities, but "the whole community". Id. at 2706. See generally SCHWEMM,
supra note 5, at § 7:3 (discussing the FHA's goal of integration).
21. See, e.g., CASHIN, supra note 17, at 125-260 (examining the problems
facing blacks in the middle class in housing and education); YINGER, supra
note 13, at 135-58 (contrasting the education system and labor market
available to whites with that open to minorities); MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 19, at 148-85 (detailing how segregation creates an underclass of
minorities, placing them at a great disadvantage for socioeconomic success).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
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FHA's tenure, the Supreme Court has affirmed that it carries out
a "policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority." 3
A. The FHA's Basic Prohibitionsand Enforcement Techniques
The FHA's most important substantive provision makes it
unlawful, inter alia, to "refuse to ... rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the.., rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color.., or national origin." 24 The FHA also bans
such discrimination in "the terms, conditions, or privileges
of... rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith"2 5 and makes it unlawful to
represent to anyone because of race, color, or national origin "that
any dwelling is not available for inspection.., or rental when such
dwelling is in fact so available."' All of the quoted provisions have
been a part of the law since the FHA was first enacted in 1968.
The FHA does exempt certain dwellings from its coverage,
most notably "Mrs. Murphy" landlords who live on the premises
and whose buildings have four or fewer units and certain singlefamily homes that are sold or rented by their owners without the
use of advertising or a real estate agent." As a practical matter,
however, these exemptions do not protect even the smallest of
landlords from claims of race or national origin discrimination.
This is because, within weeks of the FHA's enactment, the
Supreme Court held that another federal statute - the 1866 Civil
Rights Act2 8 - also bans racial discrimination in housing,29 and
this law, whose prohibition of "racial" discrimination covers
Hispanics and virtually all dark-skinned persons as well as
blacks," is not subject to the FHA's exemptions (e.g., a "Mrs.
Murphy" landlord who discriminates against a Hispanic thereby

23. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211
(1972); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290 (2003) (recognizing that the

FHA's objective is an "overriding societal priority").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). The "bona fide offer" requirement in the
first phrase of this provision has not proved to be a significant limitation,
because it does not apply to the other phrases of § 3604(a) and the concluding
phrase banning "otherwise make unavailable" techniques has been interpreted
to cover discrimination against even those who have not made a bona fide
offer. SCHWEMM, supra note 5, at §§ 13:3 to -:4.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
26. Id. § 3604(d).
27. Id. § 3603(b)(1)-(2).

28. Id. § 1982.
29. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
30. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). Cf Saint
Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (interpreting § 1982's
companion provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1981).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:455

violates the 1866 Act even though her apartment is exempt from
the FHA).3'
As the 1977 HUD testing study showed, however, the FHA
and other relevant laws did not eliminate housing discrimination
against racial and ethnic minorities." Congress' response was to
consider ways to strengthen the FHA, which was seen as
"ineffective because it
lacks an
effective
enforcement
mechanism.""
The result was the 1988 Fair Housing
Amendments Act ("FHAA"), 4 in which Congress sought to provide
the FHA with "an effective enforcement system" in order to make
its promise of nondiscrimination "a reality.""
The FHAA
strengthened all three of the FHA's enforcement techniques by: (1)
eliminating the punitive damage cap, lengthening the statute of
limitations, and making attorney's fees awards easier to obtain in
private litigation; (2) establishing an expedited administrative
complaint procedure that could result in injunctive relief,
damages, and civil penalties; and (3) authorizing the Department
of Justice to collect monetary damages for aggrieved persons in its
"pattern or practice" and "general public importance" cases.38 The
result was a civil rights law whose enforcement procedures are
second to none."
B. Experience Under the FIAA's "New and Improved"Approach
1. The 1989-2000 Period
HUD's second national testing study in 1989 was timed to
provide a picture of rental and sales discrimination when the
FHAA first became effective." As noted above, that study showed
levels of rental discrimination against blacks and Hispanics that
31. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 5, at § 27:2, n.6.
32. WIENK ET AL., supra note 8.
33. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 16 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2177 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
34. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
35. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 13.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-14. The 1988 amendments also added handicap and
familial status to the types of discrimination outlawed by the FHA and
broadened the statute's prohibition against discrimination in home financing.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06, 3617; SCHWEMM, supra note 5, at § 5:3.
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (providing for only equitable relief in
public accommodations cases under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (providing caps for monetary relief in employment cases
under Title VII of the same law); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002)
(holding that punitive damages may not be awarded under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as is also
true under Title VI of the 1964 Act).
38. 1989 STUDY, supra note 7.
The 1988 FHAA became effective one
hundred and eighty days after its passage on March 12, 1989. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601, n.(a).
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were similar to those found in 1977.3' Based on the FHAA,
however, expectations for change were high,'0 and the FHAAenhanced enforcement procedures did yield thousands of new FHA
claims.
One measure of this activity is the total number of FHA
administrative complaints filed with HUD and substantially
equivalent state and local agencies,4 which rose from 4,422 in
1988 to 7,174 in 1989.42 To be sure, many of these claims were
based on familial status and handicap - the two new protected
classes added by the FHAA ' - but the number of race and
national origin claims also rose substantially in the new law's first
year." The post-FHAA complaint levels continued to rise in the
next few years, with totals of: 7,675 in 1990; 9,192 in 1991; 9,461
in 1992; and 10,184 in 1993; before falling back slightly to 9,670 in
1994. 45
These figures included an increased number of race-based
complaints, the total of which rose from a low of 3,722 in 1989 to a
high of 5,062 in 1992, before settling back to 4,807 in 1993 and
4,645 in 1994.46 The number of national origin complaints also

39. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
40. Supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
41. The FHAA requires that an administrative complaint to HUD filed in a
state or locality with a fair housing law that is substantially equivalent to the
federal statute be referred to the appropriate state or local agency for
processing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f); SCHWEMM, supra note 5, § 24:8.
42. See U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1989: THE STATE OF FAIR
HOUSING: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 808(e)(2) OF THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT 13 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 REPORT]. All but five percent
of the 1989 complaints were filed after the FHAA became effective on March
12, 1989. Id.
By way of contrast, and to illustrate the pre-FHAA situation during the
1970s, an average of about 3,000 FHA administrative complaints were filed
annually, about ten percent of which were conciliated by HUD (there being no
other administrative remedy). U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 29-31 (1979).
43. See 1989 REPORT, supra note 42, at 14 (reporting that in the first year
the FHAA became effective, familial status and handicap were, respectively,
the first and third most frequently alleged bases of discrimination in FHA
complaints filed with HUD, with race ranking second).
44. See id. at 14 (reporting that the average monthly number of FHA
complaints to HUD based on race and national origin rose to 135 and 17,
respectively, in 1989, compared with 91 and 8 in the previous year).
45. OFFICE OF PROGRAM STANDARDS & EVALUATION, U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAIR HOUSING
PROGRAMS 12 (1996) [hereinafter 1994 REPORT].
46. 1989 REPORT, supra note 42, at 14, 19; 1994 REPORT, supra note 45, at
14; U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1990: THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING:
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 808(e)(2) OF THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT 5 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 REPORT]; U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., 1991: THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 808(e)(2) OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 5 (1992)
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increased substantially during this period, rising from a low of 620
in 1989 to levels regularly exceeding 1,000 in the years from 1990
to 1994. 7 Rental claims accounted for a large portion of the 19891994 complaints.8
HUD stopped reporting such figures after 1994, but
information from other sources shows that the total number of
FHA administrative complaints fell in the mid-1990s (to 5,818 in
1998) before beginning another steady rise in 1999.' During the
second half of the 1990s, the portion of these totals that involved
race and national origin remained fairly steady, at about fortythree and eleven percent, respectively.50 The portion of complaints
based on refusals to rent and on discriminatory terms and
conditions in rentals and sales also remained fairly steady, at
about thirty percent and sixty percent, respectively.5 Thus, even
in this period of somewhat reduced complaint levels, the number

[hereinafter 1991

REPORT].

Race-based claims accounted for 40.4% of the total

1991-1994 administrative complaint load. Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1408 tbl.1 (1998).
47. See HUD sources cited supra note 46. National origin claims accounted
for 9.4% of the total 1991-1994 administrative complaint load. Selmi, supra
note 46, at 1408 tbl.1.
48. HUD identifies the number of complaints by the type of issues raised,
such as refusal to rent, refusal to sell, and discriminatory terms and
conditions in rentals or sales (the latter category does not distinguish between
rentals and sales). The largest category in the 1989-1994 period was "terms
and conditions," which accounted for, respectively, 38%, 32%, 35%, 41%, 36%,
and 30% of the total number of complaints; refusals to rent accounted for,
respectively, 33%, 24%, 24% 27%, 22%, and 17%; and refusals to sell accounted
for, respectively, 6%, 2%, 2%, 1%, 1%, and 1%. 1990 REPORT, supra note 46, at
6; 1991 REPORT, supra note 46, at 6; 1994 REPORT, supra note 45, at 14.
49. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP: HAVE
FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS?
VOLUME IV: AN EVALUATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 121 (2004) (identifying the
totals as 5,818 in 1998; 6,139 in 1999; 6,973 in 2000; 7,010 in 2001; and 7,649
in 2002); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAIR HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES
TO IMPROVE HUD'S OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT

PROCESS 25 (2004) (reporting that the total number of complaints declined
slightly from 1996 until 1998, but then began increasing steadily to over 8,000
in 2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
50. See GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 28 (reporting that, for the total
number of complaints during the four years 1996-1999, race accounted for
43.5%, 43.6%, 45.4%, and 40.0%, and national origin accounted for 12.9%,
11.8%, 11.4%, and 9.1%).
51. See id. at 30 (reporting that, for the total number of complaints during
the four years 1996-1999, refusals to rent accounted for 36.3%, 30.2%, 24.4%,
and 27.7%, and discriminatory terms and conditions accounted for 62.7%,
64.2%, 60.9%, and 58.4%).
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of rental complaints based on race and national origin was well
above what it had been prior to enactment of the FHAA."
Some sense of the overall results achieved by these
complaints is provided by HUD's last yearly report in the 1990s,
which was for 1994. Of all the complaints filed with HUD that
year, forty percent were settled; twenty-five percent resulted in a
"no cause" determination; seven percent resulted in a "cause"
determination; and the rest were either administratively closed or
"Cause" was found in four
referred to the Justice Department.'
percent of both race-based and national origin complaints, in ten
percent of refusal-to-rent complaints, and in six percent of
discriminatory-terms-and-conditions complaints.' Total monetary
relief from all HUD, state, and local administrative claims was
$3,785,750, which amounted to an average of $2,781 per case
resolved by settlement or adjudication, and "housing relief" was
obtained in 830 (twenty-six percent) of these cases.'
Data with respect to privately initiated FHA lawsuits and
those brought by the Justice Department in the 1990s are harder
to come by. One group that tracks FHA litigation assisted by
private fair housing organizations estimates that over $166 million
was recovered from 1,330 privately initiated lawsuits closed by
settlements or judgments in the 1990 to 1999 period.56 The overall
52. For example, in the low-complaint year of 1998 when the total number
of complaints was 5,818, race accounted for 45.5% of the total or about 2,500
complaints, and national origin accounted for 11.4% of the total or about 660
complaints, both well above the comparable figures for 1988. 1989 REPORT,
supra note 42, at 14. Also in 1998, refusals to rent and discriminatory terms
and conditions accounted for, respectively, 24.4% and 60.9% of the total,
similar to what they had been in 1988. Id.
53. 1994 REPORT, supra note 45, at 16-17. In the four-year period from
1991 through 1994, forty-three percent were settled; twenty percent resulted
in a "no cause" determination; four percent resulted in a "cause"
determination; and the rest were either administratively closed or referred to
the Justice Department. Selmi, supra note 46, at 1412 tbl.2.
54. See 1994 REPORT, supra note 45, at 19 (reporting that, for complaints to
HUD, a "cause" determination was made in 93 of the 2,276 race complaints, 25
of the 591 national origin complaints, 156 of the 1,600 refusal-to-rent
complaints, and 184 of the 2,931 discriminatory-terms-and-conditions
complaints).
55. Id. at 17. "Of the [HUD] claims that were conciliated in 1991, the
median settlement was $600. Comparable figures for 1992 and 1993 were
[Tihe average [HUD] AIJ award for race$750 and $775, respectively....
based housing discrimination in 1993 was $39,214." Kathleen C. Engel,
Moving Up the Residential Hierarchy: A New Remedy for an Old Injury
Arising from Housing Discrimination,77 WASH. U. L. Q. 1153, 1186-87 (1999)
(citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 37, 62-63 (1994)).
56. FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF METROPOLITAN DETROIT, $225,000,000 AND
COUNTING 10, 26-27 (2006) [hereinafter COUNTING] (on file with author). This
report claims to capture "a very significant portion (probably the vast
majority) of the housing discrimination lawsuits filed.., in the United States"
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lawsuit-filing pace during this period averaged 156 cases per year,
with ninety-three percent of the cases resulting in some recovery
for the plaintiffs and with race-based claims accounting for just
under half of the cases and over fifty-five percent of the monetary
relief recovered. 7
Meanwhile, in 1994, the Justice Department filed twentythree "pattern or practice" cases under the FHA (fourteen
involving race and four involving national origin), along with 150
individual cases that had been "elected" out of the HUD
administrative process (thirty-eight based on race and one based
on national origin).'
During this year, Justice resolved fifteen
pattern-or-practice cases (eleven involving race and two involving
national origin) in which monetary relief of over $14,000,000 was
obtained, mostly for the persons aggrieved by the defendants'
discrimination."9
At the same time, the Justice Department
resolved ninety-eight election cases (sixteen involving race and
four involving national origin), collecting a total of $1,446,310 in
monetary relief for an average recovery of almost $15,000.6
Overall, therefore, while the number of complaints filed
during the FHAA's first decade continued "to represent only a

beginning January 1, 1990. Id. at 7.
The average per-case recovery of over $125,000 yielded by these figures
does not represent a "typical" FHA case, because the figures include three
unusual cases in which settlements of over $10 million each were obtained.
Id. at 10.; see also Engel, supra note 55, at 1187 (citing one source as placing
the average court award in 1993 fair housing cases at $28,378 and another as
placing the median trial verdict in such cases in 1992-1995 at $41,829) (citing,
respectively, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 62-63, and
Selmi, supra note 46, at 1419 tbl.4).
57. COUNTING, supra note 56, at 9-10.
58. 1994 REPORT, supra note 45, at 28-30. This report does not identify
what portion of these Justice Department cases involved rental situations.
The overall totals for 1994 were then a record number of FHA filings by the
Justice Department. Id. at 28. In subsequent years, the rate of FHA "pattern
or practice" filings remained fairly steady, but election case filings fell
substantially. See John P. Relman, Federal Fair Housing Enforcement: The
Second Clinton Administration at Mid-Term, in CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TEST OF OUR PROGRESS: THE CLINTON RECORD ON CIVIL

RIGHTS 237 (reporting that Justice filed 34 new FHA "pattern or practice"
cases in 1995-1996 and 39 more in 1997-1998, while election case filings for
these
two
periods
fell
to
149
and
57),
available
at
httpJ/www.cccr.org/images/progress.pdf.
For a description of the process by which the Department of Justice files
suit on behalf of a complainant whose administrative complaint has been
charged by HUD and "elected" by one of the parties to federal court, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 5, at §§ 24:15 to -:16.
59.

1994 REPORT, supra note 45, at 29.

60. Id. at 30; see also Selmi, supra note 46, at 1419 tbl.4, 1420 n.76
(identifying the Department of Justice's median fair housing award as $25,500
in 1992-1995 and its median awards in "election" cases as $7,500 in 1995 and
$9,500 in 1996).
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small percentage
of likely
violations,"6'
the
litigation
achievements, both in terms of complaints filed and results
achieved, were significantly greater than in the pre-FHAA period.
However, this litigation seemed to have virtually no impact on
rental discrimination rates nationwide.
As described above,
HUD's 2000 national testing study showed that these rates
remained every bit as high for Hispanics and almost as high for
blacks as they had been in 1989.62
Thus, the enhanced
enforcement techniques provided by the FHAA - and eight years
of a Democratic administration that professed to have a strong
commitment to civil rights enforcement' - had apparently made
little difference in the levels of rental discrimination.
2. The Post-2000 Period
In the years after the 2000 study, FHA litigation levels have
continued at a fairly steady pace.
With respect to FHA
administrative complaints, the total number filed with HUD and
substantially equivalent state and local agencies declined slightly
in the 1996-1998 period and then began a steady rise, with totals
of: 6,140 in 1999; 6,970 in 2000; 6,973 in 2001; 7,557 in 2002; 8,097
in 2003; 9,187 in 2004; 9,254 in 2005; and 10,328 in 2006." Thus,
the 2005-2006
levels were similar to those common in the early
65
1990s.

61. 1994 REPORT, supra note 45, at 9; see also supra note 14 and text
accompanying notes 42-45, 49 (providing FHA complaint levels and overall
number of violations).
62. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1993 CONSOLIDATED
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAIR HOUSING PROGRAMS 2 (1995). This
report states:
1993 is likely to be remembered as a watershed year in the struggle to
achieve fair housing in the United States [because ofl the renewed
Federal commitment to combating every manifestation of housing
discrimination and racial segregation.
Under the dynamic new
leadership provided by President Bill Clinton and HUD Secretary Henry
G. Cisneros, fair housing has been restored to a prominent place on the
Nation's housing agenda.
Id. But see supra note 49 and accompanying text (showing a decline in HUD
enforcement levels during President Clinton's second term); Selmi, supra note
46, at 1403, 1427, 1458-59 (arguing toward the end of the Clinton
Administration that the federal "government has failed to play a strong role as
an enforcement agency" in Democratic as well as Republican administrations,
that "the federal government's efforts [to enforce the FHA and Title VIII have
been
inadequate
throughout
both
Republican
and
Democratic
administrations," and that "the government has demonstrated repeatedly that
it will not adopt such a [vigorous enforcement] role").
64. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE
STATE OF FAIR HOUSING: FY 2006 ANNUAL REPORT ON FAIR HOUSING 3 (2007)
[hereinafter 2006 REPORT].
65. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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During the 2000-2006 period, the portion of administrative
complaints that involved race and national origin remained fairly
steady at, respectively, about thirty-nine percent and thirteen
percent,' a slight dip for race and a slight increase for national
origin compared with these rates in the late 1990s. 67 Also, during
2000-2006, the portion of these complaints based on refusals to
rent and on discriminatory terms and conditions in rental and
sales remained fairly steady at, respectively, about twenty-five
percent and fifty-seven percent,' a slight
reduction for both
69
categories compared with the late 1990s.
As for the results achieved by administrative complaints, in
2006 (the most recent year reported) HUD closed 2,578
complaints: thirty-six percent were settled; forty percent resulted
in "no cause" determinations; one percent resulted in "cause"
determinations; and the rest were either administratively closed
(twenty-two percent) or referred to the Justice Department (one
percent). ° During the same year, state and local agencies closed
6,951 complaints: thirty-three percent were settled; forty-nine

66. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 64, at 4 (reporting that during the 20032006 years, the portion of race-based complaints accounted for 39% of the total
(based on 3,185 race-based complaints) in 2003, 38% (3,512 complaints) in
2004, 38% (3,472 complaints) in 2005, and 39% (4,043 complaints) in 2006,
while the comparable figures for national origin were 13% (1,043 complaints)
in 2003, 14% (1,268 complaints) in 2004, 13% (1,225 complaints) in 2005, and
14% (1,427 complaints) in 2006); GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 28 (reporting
that the portion of race-based complaints accounted for 40.2% of the total in
2000, 39.2% in 2001, and 39.3% in 2002, while the comparable figures for
national origin were 11.7% in 2000, 12.9% in 2001, and 12.2% in 2002).
67. See supra text accompanying note 50.
68. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 64, at 5 (reporting that from 2003-2006,
the portion of refusal-to-rent complaints accounted for 23% of the total in
2003, 24% in 2004, 25% in 2005, and 26% in 2006, while the comparable
figures for terms-and-conditions complaints were 55% in 2003, 57% in 2004,
57% in 2005, and 58% in 2006); GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 30 (reporting
that the portion of refusal-to-rent complaints accounted for 28.1% of the total
in 2000, 28.4% in 2001, and 26.3% in 2002, while terms-and-conditions
complaints accounted for 56.8% of the total in 2000, 57.2% in 2001, and 55.1%
in 2002).
69. See supra text accompanying note 51.
70. 2006 REPORT, supra note 64, at 30-31. Comparable figures for the three
prior years were: in 2005, HUD closed 2,580 complaints, 39% of which were
settled, 37% resulted in "no cause" determinations, 2% resulted in "cause"
determinations, and the rest were either administratively closed (21%) or
referred to the Justice Department (1%); in 2004, HUD closed 2,884
complaints, 37% of which were settled, 46% resulted in "no cause"
determinations, 2% resulted in "cause" determinations, and the rest were
either administratively closed (15%) or referred to the Justice Department
(2%); and in 2003, HUD closed 2,818 complaints, 38% of which were settled,
41% resulted in "no cause" determinations, 1% resulted in "cause"
determinations, and the rest were either administratively closed (18%) or
referred to the Justice Department (2%). Id.
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percent resulted in "no cause" determinations; six percent resulted
in
"cause" determinations;
and
twelve
percent
were
administratively closed.7" Of the thirty-three cases in which a
HUD charge was pending in 2006, over half (seventeen) were
elected to federal court for prosecution by the Justice Department,
and most of the rest were resolved by settlements (nine); one
resulted in a favorable administrative decision."2 Of the nine HUD
settlements, three involved race (which produced a total of $22,500
for the complainants), and none involved national origin.73 Thus,
administrative cases achieved substantially less overall relief in
2006 than they did in 1994. 7
Complaints to private fair housing organizations averaged
over 17,000 per year after 2000. 7' During the 2000-2005 period,
private lawsuits resulting from such complaints recovered over
$63,000,000 from 882 concluded cases, 76 which meant that filings
per-year and recoveries per-case were somewhat down from the
1990s. 77
The overall lawsuit-filing pace during this period
averaged 147 cases per year, with ninety-four percent of the cases
resulting in some recovery for the plaintiffs. Race-based claims
accounted for a smaller portion of the total number of cases
(thirty-three percent) but still over half of the overall monetary
relief recovered (fifty-three percent).7' National origin accounted
for four percent of the cases.7 ' Rental transactions were involved

71. Id. at 53, 55. Comparable figures for the prior three years were: in
2005, these agencies closed 6,649 complaints, 31% of which were settled, 51%
resulted in "no cause" determinations, 6% resulted in "cause" determinations,
and 11% were administratively closed; in 2004, these agencies closed 6,547

complaints, 33% of which were settled, 51% resulted in "no cause"
determinations, 6% resulted in "cause" determination, and 10% were
administratively closed; and in 2003, these agencies closed 5,670 complaints,
33% of which were settled, 52% resulted in "no cause" determinations, 6%

resulted in "cause" determination, and 9% were administratively closed. Id.
72. Id. at 34. The one charged case that resulted in an administrative

decision in 2006 was initially dismissed by the HUD AIU, but this decision
was ultimately reversed by the HUD Secretary in an opinion favorable to the

complainant. Id. at 36.
73. Id. at 36.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
75. See NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, 2006 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS
REPORT 17 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 TRENDS] (on file with author) (giving the
figures of 16,789 for 2005; 18,094 for 2004; 17,022 for 2003; and 17,543 for
2002); See 2004 Trends, supra note 9, at 5 (providing the figure of 16,500 for

2001).
76. COUNTING, supra note 56, at 14.

When this period's recoveries are

added to those of the 1990s, the total amount generated by post-FHAA private
lawsuits exceeds $225,000,000. Id. at 4.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
78. See COUNTING, supra note 56, at 10.

79. Id. at 15.
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in more than seventy-seven percent of the cases 80
The pace of Justice Department litigation involving FHA race
and national origin charges has slowed somewhat in the post-2000
period. From the beginning of 2001 through August of 2006,
Justice filed 198 FHA cases, including 59 based on race and 19
based on national origin.8
In early 2006, however, the
Department announced a program to increase the number of its
paired-test investigations so as to achieve an all time high in
Department of Justice testing since 1991, when this testing
program began. 2
Overall, therefore, the post-2000 levels of FHA litigation have
been similar to or slightly lower than those of the prior decade.'
80. Id.
81. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Sues
Los Angeles Landlord for Engaging in Discrimination on the Basis of Race,
National Origin, and Familial Status (Aug. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/sterlingpr.pdf.
These totals
include both "pattern or practice" and "election" cases; the former accounted
for about 100 cases (29 involving race and 10 involving national origin), and
the latter accounted for about 100 cases (29 involving race and 10 involving
national origin). With respect to individual years, the National Fair Housing
Alliance puts the Justice case filings at 42 in 2005; 38 in 2004; 29 or 35 in
2003; 49 or 63 in 2002; and 49 in 2001. See 2004 TRENDS, supra note 9, at 5-6;
2006 TRENDS, supra note 75, at 17, 19. These sources state that, of Justice's
42 filed cases in 2005, 23% involved race and 10% involved national origin;
and of its 35 filed cases in 2003, 29% involved race and 10% involved national
origin).
82. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Department of
Justice Initiative to Combat Housing Discrimination "Operation Home Sweet
Home" (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/
February/06_opa_079.html.
83. It is not my purpose here to attempt an evaluation of the Bush
Administration's record of fair housing enforcement or to compare it to that of
prior administrations.
Others have criticized the Bush civil rights
enforcement record. See, e.g., Letter from the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law to the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair and Ranking
Member (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.civilrights.org/issues/
enforcement/remote-page.jsp?itemlD=28310175.
Such criticisms, while
distressing, are not relevant to my main point, which is that, even if a more
FHA-aggressive administration had been in power in recent years, this might
not have succeeded in changing landlords' illegal behavior to any significant
degree.
One part of the Bush Administration's record that is relevant here is its
selection of federal judges whose support for civil rights laws is tepid at best.
See, e.g., Press Release, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Second
Hearing on Controversial Nominee Focuses on Civil Rights (Feb. 8, 2002),
available at http'/www.civilrights.org/press-room/buzzclips/second-hearingon-controversial-nominee-focuses-on-civil-rights.html
(criticizing
Charles
Pickering, a Bush appointee to the Fifth Circuit, for his "extreme" record on
civil rights); Press Release, Leadership Conference on Civil- Rights, AfricanAmerican Leaders Voice Opposition to Janice Rogers Brown (Nov. 5, 2003),
available
at
http://www.civilrights.org/press-room/buzz-Clips/africanamerican-leaders-voice-opposition-to-janice-rogers-brown.html (calling Bush's
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As the 1989-2000 period shows, however, even if more litigation
had occurred in recent years, there is no guarantee that this would
have reduced the levels of illegal discrimination by landlords. And
while no recent national study exists to determine whether the
post-2000 litigation has had as little impact as that of the 1990s,84
there is substantial evidence that rental discrimination against
racial and ethnic minorities continues unabated.85 Thus, there is
no reason to believe that the "cure" for this problem offered by the
FHA has fared any better in recent years than in the FHAA's early
years. Moreover, as Part III will show, this problem may actually

nomination of Janice Rogers Brown "cynical" for her hostility towards civil
rights). This is relevant, because, to the extent FHA enforcement has proved
ineffective in reducing rental discrimination through 2000 when the federal
judiciary was at least modestly supportive of civil rights, a continued reliance
on such enforcement in a future era that will likely be characterized by a less
supportive federal judiciary is even harder to justify.
84. The FHA directs HUD to "make studies with respect to the nature and
extent
of
discriminatory
housing
practices
in
representative
communities ...throughout the United States," but it does not mandate how
frequently such studies should be conducted. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(1); see also
YINGER, supra note 13, at 224 (suggesting that "a national audit study of the
rental housing market should be conducted by HUD at least every 5 years").
85. See, e.g., GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, FOR
RENT, UNLESS YOU'RE BLACK: AN AUDIT REPORT AND STUDY ON RACE
DISCRIMINATION IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS METROPOLITAN RENTAL
HOUSING MARKET (2007), available at http://www.gnofairhousing.orglpdfs/
GNOFHAC%2ORental%20Audit.pdf (reporting, based on paired tests of forty
rental properties conducted throughout the New Orleans metropolitan area
between September 2006 and April 2007, that blacks encountered less
favorable treatment than whites 57.5% of the time); Adrian G. Carpusor &
William E. Loges, Rental Discrimination and Ethnicity in Names, 36 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 934, 941 (2006) (reporting, based on 1,115 email
inquiries sent to Los Angeles County landlords in 2003, that the responses
favored those sent from a white-sounding name ("Patrick McDougall") over
those from an Arab-sounding name ("Said Al-Rahman") and a black-sounding
name ("Tyrell Jackson")); NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, No HOME FOR
THE HOLIDAYS: REPORT ON HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HURRICANE
KATRINA SURVIVORS (2005), available at httpJ/www.nationalfairhousing.org/
resources/newsArchive/resource_07824627156408113400.pdf (reporting, based
on sixty-six paired telephone rental tests in 2005 in five southern states, that
whites were favored over blacks in sixty-six percent of the tests); FAIR
HOUSING COUNCIL OF SUBURBAN PHILADELPHIA, AN AUDIT OF RACE
DISCRIMINATION IN THE SUBURBAN PHILADELPHIA RENTAL MARKET IN 2001
(2002),
available at
http://www.fhcsp.com/Laws/rental-audit_2002.htm
(reporting, based on sixty-four paired tests in 2001, that black renters "face
discriminatory treatment in 41% of the time in the Suburban Philadelphia
area"); FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF GREATER BOSTON, "WE DON'T WANT YOUR
KIND LIVING HERE:" A REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION IN THE GREATER BOSTON
RENTAL MARKET (2001), available at http://www.bostonfairhousing.org/rental
_audit_2001.pdf (reporting, based on a paired testing study in 2001, that black
renters were discriminated against in at least half of their attempts to find
apartments in the greater Boston area); see also sources cited infra note 119.
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get worse in the coming decade, as minority groups come to
comprise an ever larger portion of the nation's renters.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET
Some 34,000,000 United States households - about one-third
of the nation's total - live in rental housing." This number has
changed little over the past decade, although a slight increase did
occur in 2005, with a corresponding decline in the national rental
vacancy rate.87
As a group, renters "tend to be younger, have lower incomes,
[and] are more likely to be minorities or immigrants.'
The share
of renter households made up of racial and ethnic minorities has
risen dramatically over the past quarter century to stand at fortythree percent in 2004, as millions more minority households
became renters and offset a comparable decline in the number of
white renters. 9
Half of all minority households are renters,
86. JOINT CENTER FOR

HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION 1 (2006)
[hereinafter RENTAL HOUSING], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu
publications/rental/rh06_americas-rental-housing.pdf.
87. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE
STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING: 2006, 20 (2006) [hereinafter 2006
HOUSING], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/
son2006/index.htm; see also Eduardo Porter, Rents Are Rising Rapidly After
Long Lull, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at C1 (reporting that the national rental
vacancy rate had declined to 9.6% in the second quarter of 2006). Among the
factors underlying the recent tightening in the rental market were a slowdown
in multifamily rental construction (to 195,000 units in 2005 from 275,000 in
2002), an increasing number of condominium conversions (involving over
63,000 apartments in 2004 and another 203,000 in 2005), and the first decline
in the national homeownership rate in ten years. 2006 HOUSING, supra, at 20,
35. However, in the coming decade, overall housing production is expected to
set new records in response to a substantial growth in the number of
households. Id. at 2.
88. WILLIAM APGAR, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING: EXPANDING THE
ABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publications/markets/w04-11.pdf. Renters also move more frequently than
home buyers. Id. at 23. Fifty-eight percent of "the more than 23 million
households changing residence in 2001 moved into a rental unit." Id. at 23-24.
89. See 2006 HOUSING, supra note 87, at 21 (reporting that the minority
share of renter households was 27% in 1980, 31% in 1990, and 43% in 2004);
RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 86, at 5 (reporting that, in the 1994-2004 period,
minority renters rose by nearly three million households, while the number of
white renters underwent a comparable decline).
A large part of the increase in minority renters has been fueled by
immigration. In 2003, immigrants headed 16% of all renter households,
nearly 30% of all minority renter households, and 54% of Hispanic renter
households. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING: 2005 21 (2005) [hereinafter 2005
HOUSING], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son
2005/index.html.
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compared to only a quarter of white households.' In the coming
decade, the number of rental households is expected to increase by
nearly 2,000,000, fueled primarily by the continued strength of
immigration and growth in the number of young minority
households; the number of white renters is expected to continue to
decline, so that minorities will make up over half of all renters by
2015.9'

Although many well-to-do people choose to rent rather than
buy their homes, affordability is a serious problem for many
renters. Low-income households make up a large and rapidly
growing segment of the rental market, and for many of these
people, renting is not a matter of choice.'
Rental costs have
increased faster than inflation over the past decade and now stand
at an all-time high.93 One in five renter households pays at least
half of their income for housing.'
The inventory of rental units stood at 37.2 million in 2003. 95
The vast majority of these (nearly 27 million) are unsubsidized
and privately owned, and seventy percent of these units (almost 19
million) are in single-family or small (two-to-nine-unit)
multifamily structures." More than one third of renters live in
single family homes.97 As for the remaining two thirds who live in
90. APGAR, supra note 88, at 23.

"This difference reflects, in part, that

minorities are younger, have lower incomes, and are less likely to be married
- all characteristics associated with a greater tendency to rent." Id.
91. RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 86, at 5, 7.
92. Id. at 1, 7.

93. Id. at 16. Average gross monthly rent (rent plus utility costs) moved up
steadily in constant dollars from 1996 to 2004, when it reached $711. Id. at
16, 26. In the 1993-2003 period, 2,000,000 low-cost units were razed and/or
withdrawn from the market, reducing by thirteen percent the number of units
renting for less than $400 in inflation-adjusted terms. Id. at 2. Most of the
new units built during this period were targeted toward the high end of the
market.

Id.

In 2004, the average monthly rent for newly constructed,

privately owned, unsubsidized apartments had risen to $974 (at least thirty
seven percent above the median for all units), up from $734 in 1994 (only ten
percent more than the median for all units). Id. at 11. The rise in rental rates
has continued through 2006. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 87, at C1 (reporting
on government data showing that average rents nationally were 3.5% higher
in mid-2006 than a year earlier).
94. APGAR, supra note 88, at 3.
95. See RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 86, at 8, 30. This represents an
increase of one million units in the preceding decade. Id. This does not
include the more than three million owner-occupied manufactured homes that
are placed on leased land. See APGAR, supra note 88, at 14.
96. APGAR, supra note 88, at 26. According to a HUD survey completed in
the mid-1990s, nearly 1.1 million rental units were located in two-unit to fourunit structures with a resident owner. Id. (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS
SURVEY (POMS) (1996)).
97. Id. The share of renters living in single-family homes peaked at 37.5%
in the late 1990s. 2005 HOUSING, supra note 89, at 21.
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multifamily structures, the rental stock is becoming more
weighted toward larger properties, as new multifamily
construction has shifted away from two-to-four-unit buildings in
favor of much bigger structures.9
Rental housing is a huge industry in the United States,9 but
many landlords are small owners who easily enter and leave the
market and who are generally not subject to any training or
licensing requirements."
Individuals own more than half of all
rental units.'
Some 4.3 million households earn rental income
from a second property, and most of these (nearly eighty percent)
have only one rental property.," 2 Half of individual rental property
owners are fifty-five years old or over."
These older owners and, for that matter, small property owners in general - tend to
run their own properties without employing outside agents."°
This overview of the United States rental market has a
number of fair housing implications. Clearly, the FHA's goal of
eliminating racial and national origin discrimination in rental
housing will be increasingly challenged in the next decade, as
minorities come to represent an ever larger share of renter
households.
This is true even without considering potential
problems in the home-sale market"5 or rental discrimination
98. See 2006 HOUSING, supra note 87, at 22-23. Between 1999 and 2004,
the share of multifamily rental units completed in structures with at least fifty
units increased from thirteen to twenty-four percent, while the share of such
units in structures with two to four apartments dropped from nine to five
percent. Id.
99. "R]enter households pay nearly $250 billion... annually to rental
property owners [who] spend approximately $50 billion each year to maintain
and improve a rental housing inventory that is now valued at over $2.5
trillion." APGAR, supra note 88, at 22.
100. See, e.g., id. at 26 (noting that for "many property owners, operating
rental housing is a part time business"); YINGER, supra note 13, at 224 (noting
that "[tihe rental market contains many small sellers who are largely
unregulated").
101. 2006 HOUSING, supra note 87, at 23 (reporting ownership of the U.S.
rental stock in 2005 was made up of 56% individuals, 24% partnerships, 11%
corporations, and 9% other categories).
102. Id. at 23-24 (reporting that 3.4 million of the 4.3 million households
that have rental income own only one such property). Furthermore, at least
one third of these one-property owners have only a single-family rental. Id. at
24. Five out of six single-family rentals are owned by individuals or married
couples. 2005 HOUSING, supra note 89, at 21.
103. 2006 HOUSING, supra note 87, at 24.
104. Id.
105. Predatory lending and foreclosure techniques in the home-sale market
have been focused on minority groups. These practices may result in a
disproportionate share of minorities being forced to give up their houses and
seek rental units in the coming years. See HAROLD L. BRUCE ET AL.,
SUBPRIME FORECLOSURES: THE SMOKING GUN OF PREDATORY LENDING?, 67-

68, available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/brd/12Bunce.pdf
(discussing the high levels of foreclosure by predatory or subprime lenders and
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issues involving income and immigration status, factors which,
while not directly addressed by the FHA, often impact minorities
far more than whites." 6 On the supply side, the growing number
of large apartment complexes suggests that professional rental
agents will account for a greater share of those people who must
decide on a daily basis whether or not to obey the FHA. At the
same time, individual owners who personally manage one or a few
units and who tend to be older and richer - and therefore are
statistically likely to be of a different racial or ethnic background
than their prospective tenants - will continue to play a major role
in this market.
IV. MORE ON WHAT'S KNOWN AND NOT KNOWN
ABOUT RENTAL DISCRIMINATION

As noted above, HUD's three national testing studies have
provided overall measures of rental discrimination against blacks
and Hispanics," 7 but they and related studies also include a good
deal of additional information about this topic. This part reviews
the methodology used in the HUD studies and some analyses that
have been done of their testing results to determine more precisely
what is and is not known about rental discrimination.
A. The HUD Testing Studies' Methodology and
Its Limits in MeasuringRental Discrimination
The basic methodology for HUD's three national testing
studies was the same."8 In the 2000 study, twenty metropolitan
areas with significant black and/or Hispanic populations were
chosen as sites for testing from the twenty-five sites covered in the
1989 study." The agents targeted for these tests were randomly
the concentration of such lenders in minority and low-income neighborhoods);
Les Christie, Supbrime Foreclosures Spike: Many Vulnerable Americans Will
Lose Their Homes During the Next Few Years, CNNMoney.com, Dec. 20, 2006,
http://money.com/2006/12/20/realestate/subprime-mortgageforeclosures/inde
x.htm (discussing the increase in foreclosures due to subprime loans).
106. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337 (M.D. Pa.
2006) (issuing temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of
defendant's local ordinances restricting rentals to non-U.S. citizens on the
ground that plaintiffs, whose claims were based in part on the FHA, had "a
reasonable probability of success on the merits"); Michelle Chen, As Predatory
Lending Adapts to Weak Regulations,the Poor Pay, THE NEW STANDARD (July
2006), http://newstandardnews.net/contentindex.cfm/items/3432 (highlighting
the impact of financial predators on underrepresented minority groups,

particularly Latino immigrants).
107. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
108. See 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at 2-1 to -3.
109. Id. at 2-1 to -2. In the twenty sites chosen for the 2000 study, both
black and Hispanic testing was done in six (Los Angeles, New York, Chicago,
Houston, Denver, and Austin), black-only testing was done in ten (Atlanta,
Philadelphia, Detroit, Washington, D.C., New Orleans, Pittsburgh, Dayton-
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selected based on housing ads appearing in the metropolitan area's
major Sunday newspaper. " ° Only ads for certain types of rental
housing were considered (e.g., for non-luxury, non-subsidized units
intended for year-round occupancy)."' Another requirement was
that the ads must have been placed by a real estate agency, rental
property management company, or locator service,"'
which had
3
the effect of eliminating most FHA-exempt units.1
For every rental test, a call was made in advance to obtain
certain information about the advertised unit, such as its date of
availability."" After their tests, all testers filled out detailed
report forms describing their interaction with the landlord or
rental agent.
To determine whether a paired test showed differential
treatment, four key aspects of the interaction were considered: (1)
availability of the advertised unit and other units; (2) ability to
inspect the advertised unit and other units; (3) quoted rent and
other costs (e.g., security deposits and application fees); and (4)
degree of agent encouragement (e.g., asking the tester to fill out an
application, saying the tester was qualified, and follow-up
contacts)."' Based on an evaluation of these factors, each paired
test was classified in one of three categories: white-favored;
Springfield, Orlando, Macon/Warner/Robins, and Birmingham), and Hispaniconly testing was done in four (San Antonio, Pueblo, San Diego, and Tucson).
Id. at 2-2. In each of these twenty metro areas, at least seventy-two paired
tests were conducted, with each tester trying to inspect at least three units in
the test. Id. at 2-6, 2-13.
110. Id. at 2-3 to -4.
111. Id. at 2-4.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the FHA's "singlefamily-house" and "Mrs. Murphy" exemptions). The 2000 study's focus on
agency ads guaranteed the exclusion of units covered by the single-familyhouse exemption, because this exemption is lost when the owner uses "the
sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate
broker, agent, or salesman, or... such facilities or services of any person in
the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any
such broker, agent, salesman, or person." 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1)(A). The adselection criteria did not guarantee exclusion of "Mrs. Murphy" units, see
§ 3603(b)(2), but probably did exclude the vast majority of these units as a
practical matter, because most "Mrs. Murphy" landlords do not use agents.
See supra text accompanying note 104. In any event, as noted above, neither
exemption allows landlords to discriminate against blacks or Hispanics under
the 1866 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1982). Thus, as the 2000 study put it:
"By advertising in a widely available outlet, a housing agent is explicitly
inviting inquiries from the general public and is implicitly declaring his or her
compliance with the federal fair housing laws." 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at
2-5.
114. 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at 2-10. If the advertised unit was no
longer available, the caller asked about other units that might be coming
available. Id.
115. Id. at 2-16 to -17, 2-21.
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minority-favored; or equal treatment.1 "'
Finally, an overall
statistical analysis was done to calculate rates of black-white and
Hispanic-white discrimination
for each metropolitan area and the
11 7
nation as a whole.
By focusing only on certain parts of the rental process, the
HUD testing studies have almost certainly undercounted the
amount of discrimination that actually exists in rental housing.
For example, these studies fail to capture discrimination that
occurs in: (1) owner-occupied units and other small structures that
do not employ rental agents, which comprise a significant portion
of the rental market; 8 (2) the preliminary telephone-contact stage,
where discrimination is a frequent phenomenon in today's housing
markets; 9 (3) the pre-rental phase after a prospective tenant
submits an application; and (4) post-rental terms and conditions,
such as discriminatory services, harassment, and eviction
procedures, even though such post-acquisition terms-andconditions discrimination is frequently cited as a basis for FHA
complaints. 2 ' In addition, the 2000 study's exclusive use of
116. Id. at 2-14, 2-19 to -20.
117. Id. at 3-1 to -9.
118. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., FAIR HOUSING OF MARIN, ACCENTS SPEAK LOUDER THAN
WORDS: NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION IN RENTAL HOUSING 1, 14 (2005),

available at httpJ/www.fairhousingmarin.com/news/FinalVoiceIDAuditRepjs.
pdf (reporting, based on sixty telephone tests in three northern California
counties in 2005-2006, that home-seekers with an identifiable Latino voice
encountered discrimination in rental housing sixty-eight percent of the time);
NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, supra note 85 (reporting a sixty-six

percent rate of discrimination against black renters in paired telephone tests
in 2005); FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF SUBURBAN PHILADELPHIA, supra note 85

(reporting various examples of discrimination against black testers based on
telephone inquiries); FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF GREATER BOSTON, ACCESS
DENIED: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LATINOS IN THE GREATER BOSTON RENTAL

MARKET (2002), available at http://www.bostonfairhousing.orgpublications.
htm (reporting, based on fifty paired telephone tests in the Boston area in
2002, that Latino home-seekers were discriminated against in fifty-two
percent of the tests); Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of Black
English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: New Methods
and Findings, 36 URBAN AFFAIRS REV. 461 (2001) (finding, based on 474
telephone tests inquiring about rental units in the Philadelphia area in 1999,
that housing providers frequently favored white-sounding callers over blacksounding callers); Press Release, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, HUD Charges the Hillebold Family Trust with Violating the
Fair Housing Act (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/theo/
enforcement/Stover-media-adv.pdf (reporting that landlord-respondent in
HUD-charged case said she would quote higher security deposits to AfricanAmerican callers whom she could identify over the phone by "something in
their speech").
120. See supra notes 48, 68 (identifying the high percentage of FHA
administrative complaint made up of "terms and conditions" complaints,
although not distinguishing within this category between pre-rental and postrental complaints). For recent examples of cases dealing with discrimination
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Sunday newspaper ads to identify testing targets may not reflect
how many, if not most, people are now searching for apartments
(e.g., by computer);... and to the extent that modern rental
searches do rely on internet ads and other electronic methods,
there is substantial evidence of widespread discrimination in this
122
area.

These omissions suggest that the actual rates of rental
discrimination against blacks and Hispanics are higher than the
21.6% and 25.7% figures reported in the 2000 study.22 However,
because we are concerned here primarily with how such
discrimination has changed over time, this realization, while
troubling, is a tangential point. In other words, while blacks and
Hispanics may well face rental discrimination more frequently
than the 2000 study suggests, there is no way to know if these
higher rates have gone up or down over the life of the FHA,
because prior studies also failed to capture these additional areas
of potential discrimination.

against minority tenants, see Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
Justice Department Settles Allegations of Race Discrimination Against
Minneapolis Landlord (Aug. 17, 2006), available at http//www.usdoj.gov/
crt/housing/documents/kreisler-pr.pdf (reporting settlement of case alleging,
inter alia, that defendant-landlords failed to provide necessary maintenance to
and sought to evict black tenants in two large apartment complexes); Housing
Rights Center v. Sterling, No. CV 03-859 DSF, 2005 WL 3320738 (C.D. Cal.,
Nov. 1, 2005) (awarding attorneys' fees after settlement of case alleging
various forms of discrimination against black and Hispanic tenants in
defendant's apartment buildings).
121. See, e.g., YINGER, supra note 13, at 185 ("[Ain exclusive focus on
advertised units will miss a great deal of discrimination."). For a detailed
examination of how housing search differs by race showing that minorities
tend to use newspaper ads less than whites, see Harriet Newberger, Sources of
Difference in Information Used by Black and White Housing Seekers: An
ExploratoryAnalysis, 32 URB. STUDIES 445 (1995).
122. See, e.g., Carpusor & Loges, supra note 85; see also Mike Hughlett,
Craigslist Suit Faces Speech Hurdle, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 2006, at B1
(reporting on: (1) suit against a national website that allegedly ran some 100
discriminatory housing ads in a six-month period, including those that read
"No Minorities" and "African Americans and Arabians tend to clash with me
so that won't work out"; (2) Justice Department's 2003 settlement of a similar
suit in New Jersey; and (3) the fact that HUD is "currently investigating about
a dozen [such] complaints"); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommate.com, No. CV 03-09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488 (C.D. Cal., Sept.
30, 2004), on appeal, No. 04-56916 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing FHA complaint
alleging that defendant's website carried numerous discriminatory housing
ads based on immunity provided by the 2004 Communications Decency Act).
For more on the Justice Department's case, see Consent Order, United States
v. Spider Web Enterprises LLC, No. 03-1509(DMC) (D. N.J. 2003), available at
httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/spydersettle.htm.
123. See supra text accompanying note 6 (noting the rates of discrimination
in the 2000 HUD study).
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B Other InformationAbout Rental
Discriminationfrom PriorStudies
Some other useful information has been revealed by the test
data produced by HUD's three national studies. One is that, as
shown by both the 1989 and 2000 studies, rental discrimination
rates vary among metropolitan areas. Thus, for example, rental
discrimination against blacks in 2000 was worse in Atlanta than
Chicago,
and was worse against Hispanics in New York than
1 24
Denver.
An "obvious factor" underlying rental agents' prejudice,
according to Professor John Yinger, a co-author of the 1989 HUD
study, "is the agent's own race or ethnicity. Compared to white
agents, black agents are less likely to be prejudiced against black
customers and Hispanic agents are less likely to be prejudiced
against Hispanic customers."12' Based on the 1989 test data,
Professor Yinger also found that a neighborhood's minority
26
composition influences discrimination in the rental market.
Discrimination rates might also rise with the age of the rental
agent, although studies focusing on this factor have reached
somewhat different results.'27
124. 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at iv, 4-2 to -7, 8-6. However, according to
two authors of the 2000 study: "Although patterns of differential treatment
vary across metropolitan areas, overall levels of treatment favoring whites are
generally not significantly different from the national average." Margery
Austin Turner & Stephen L. Ross, How Racial Discrimination Affects the
Search for Housing, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING
CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 93 (Xavier de Souza Briggs, ed., 2005).
125. YINGER, supra note 13, at 168; see also id. at 182 (noting that a large
rental testing study in the Detroit area during the 1980s found that
"discrimination in inspections is lower when the agent is black than when the
agent is white" (citing Canopy Roychouddhury & Allen C. Goodman, An
Ordered Probit Model for Estimating Racial Discrimination Through Fair
Housing Audits, 2 J. Hous. ECON. 358 (1992))); 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at
8-10 (finding, in certain aspects of rental tests, that "Hispanic agents
discriminate less against Hispanic renters than do white agents").
Minority agents, however, often do favor whites. See id. 7-8 (finding
that Hispanic agents are more likely to discriminate against blacks in many
aspects of rental tests than are white or black agents); Jan Ondrich et al., Do
Landlords Discriminate?The Incidence and Causes of Racial Discrimination
in Rental Housing Markets, 8 J. HOUS. ECON. 185, 197 (1999) (finding, based
on an analysis of the data from HUD's 1989 study, that "[i]f the agent is black,
there is a greater chance of favorable treatment of the white [tester]" in blackwhite tests and that "when the agent is Hispanic, the white [tester] is more
likely to receive favorable treatment than the black teammate").
126. YINGER, supra note 13, at 174; see also id. at 182 (citing a large Detroit
rental testing study that found "less discrimination when the advertised unit
is in a black or integrated area than when it is in a white area").
127. Compare id. at 345 n.54 (noting that a study based on the 1977 test
results concluded that "both the oldest and youngest [rental] agents
discriminated less than the middle-aged agents"), with id. at 182 (noting that
a Detroit-area rental study in the 1980s concluded that "older agents
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Discrimination rates may also be affected by an apartmentseeker's nonracial demographics (e.g., sex, age, family
composition). For example, a study based on HUD's 1977 test data
showed that "black males encounter more [rental] discrimination
than black females,"1 8 but the 2000 HUD study did not confirm
this,"9 and indeed showed that discrimination in providing
information about apartment-application fees was higher for
female than male Hispanics.' 30 The 1977-based study also found
that older testers and those purporting to have children
encountered less discrimination, 3' although the latter finding
conflicts with a 1980s rental study.'32 This later study also found
that rental "discrimination declines when the [tester's] assigned
role includes a college education. " "
C. Speculation on the Causes of Rental Discrimination
Commentators on the data produced by HUD's three national
testing studies have tried to identify the causes of housing
discrimination. In the decade after HUD's 1977 study, John
Yinger, George Galster, and other social scientists suggested that
the causes included, along with housing agents' personal
prejudices, economic incentives such as catering to white

discriminate more than younger agents"), and Ondrich, supra note 125, at
197, 201 (concluding, based on the data from HUD's 1989 study, that "the
agent's age is positively related to the difference in treatment" of both blacks
and Hispanics). Cf 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at 7-7 to 7-8 (finding
generally that "[o]lder agents are consistently more likely than younger agents
to discriminate on housing availability and inspections" for both blacks and
Hispanics, but that "older agents are less likely than younger agents to
discriminate [against Hispanics] about whether an application fee is
required").
With respect to the agent's sex, the 2000 study found that female agents
were more likely to discriminate on housing inspections in rental tests
involving Hispanics, but that this factor was not significant in black/white
rental tests. Id.
128. YINGER, supra note 13, at 180 (citing Clifford E. Reid, An Analysis of
Racial Discrimination in Rental Housing Markets (1987) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Grinnell College)).
129. 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at 7-8.
130. Id.
131. YINGER, supra note 13, at 345 n.54. There was also some evidence in
HUD's 1989 study that discrimination was less likely in Hispanic rental tests
if the testers were older. Ondrich, supra note 125, at 201-02.
132. YINGER, supra note 13, at 182 (citing Roychouddhury & Goodman,
supra note 125, as finding that discrimination is higher when rental testers
purport to have school-aged children); see also Ondrich, supra note 125, at
201-02 (finding, based on the 1989 HUD study, that "[tihe presence of children
led to greater discrimination" against Hispanics in rental tests).
133. YINGER, supra note 13, at 182; see also Ondrich, supra note 125, at 20102 (finding, based on the 1989 HUD study, that rental discrimination against
Hispanics falls as family income increases).
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customers' prejudices.'34 In his 1995 book reviewing HUD's 1989
data and various other studies on both sales and rental
discrimination, Professor Yinger reiterated the view that housing
discrimination has multiple causes and concluded that the
available evidence supports:
the view that some agents discriminate because of their own
personal prejudice against minorities ....

[Also] the evidence

strongly supports the view that many ...agents tend to protect
their current and potential business with prejudiced whites. The
evidence also suggests that some agents avoid investing time in
minority customers who are unlikely to complete a transaction or
act on the perceptions that whites do not want to live in integrated
and that minorities do not want to be pioneers in all-white
areas 135
areas.

agents' personal prejudice against
These three factors minorities; agents' perception that their white customers are
prejudiced against minorities; and agents' stereotypes about what
minority and white customers want or can afford - were also
identified in other analyses of the 1989 study, including one that
specifically addressed discrimination by landlords."'
Based on this earlier work, the authors of the 2000 HUD
study analyzed their data to determine whether sales and rental
discrimination could be attributed to these three sources. They
determined that, for both sales and rentals, "discrimination varies
with several factors likely to be associated with agent prejudice," 37
but found the 2000 evidence mixed about the latter two factors.
Nevertheless, the 2000 study authors concluded that these results
134. See, e.g., George C. Galster, The Ecology of Racial Discrimination in

Housing, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 84, 87 (1987) (citing, inter alia, John Yinger,
Prejudice and Discrimination in the Urban Housing Market, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 430 (P. Mieszkowski & M. Straszhein, eds.,

1987) (discussing the various theories that attempt to explain racial
discrimination in the housing market)); see also John Yinger, Measuring
Discrimination With Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. ECON.

REV. 881, 881 (1986) ("Housing agents cater to the racial prejudice of current
or potential white customers.").
135. YINGER, supra note 13, at 184.
136. See Ondrich, supra note 125, at 185 (concluding that for both black and
Hispanic testers, "landlords discriminate both out of personal prejudice and in
response to the prejudice of present and future white clients" and that "rental
housing agents continue to discriminate both because of economic incentives
that flow from the prejudice of their white customers and because of their own
Cf. Jan Ondrich et al., Do Real Estate Brokers Choose to
prejudice").
Discriminate?Evidence from the 1989 Housing DiscriminationStudy, 64 S.
ECON. J. 880, 890 (1998) (reaching similar conclusions with respect to housing
sales); Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Gender and Race Discriminationin Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 841-42 (1991) (identifying similar factors
as causing race and national origin discrimination in new car pricing).
137. 2000-I STUDY, supra note 6, at 7-6.
138. Id.
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confirmed the view of previous commentators that "discrimination
can have several different causes." 39
D. More on the CausationIssue in Light of the FHA
But why have these "causes" - particularly agent-prejudice
- not faded over time or been curbed more by the Nation's fair
housing laws? To put the question another way, why do landlords
continue to discriminate - even assuming they are inclined to do
so by personal or perceived customer prejudice - by acting on
these prejudices rather than complying with the law? As to this
issue, we know very little.
Twice in recent years, HUD has conducted national surveys
designed to find out what people know about fair housing laws. 4 °
This question may be somewhat related to the question of why
people discriminate,14 ' but the two questions are not the same, and
indeed their relationship is not easy to gauge. 4 Furthermore, the
HUD studies dealing with what people know - which asked
randomly selected persons to opine on the legality of housing
providers' behavior in ten hypothetical scenarios - did not deal
with rental discrimination based on race or national origin,1
suggesting that the study designers thought the illegality of this
type of discrimination so obvious as not to be worth asking about.
After nearly four decades of experience with the FHA, it does seem
justified to assume that landlords know race-based rental
discrimination is illegal, although, given the ease of entry into this
business, 44 some lack of awareness about discrimination laws may
well exist among current landlords and their agents.
In any
139. Id. at 7-13.
140. See ABRAVANEL, supra note 11 (reporting on a 2005 survey); MARTIN D.
ABRAVANEL & MARY K. CUNNINGHAM, How MUCH Do WE KNOW? PUBLIC
AWARENESS OF THE NATION'S FAIR HOUSING LAWS (2002), available at

http://www.huduser.orgPublications/pdf/hmwk.pdf (reporting on a 2000-2001
survey).
141. See ABRAVANEL, supra note 11, at 3 n.5 ("[i1t is logical that the more
home sellers, landlords, and others involved in housing transactions know
about fair housing law, the more they can be expected to comply with it.").
142. See infra Part V.
143. See ABRAVANEL, supra note 11, at 8-9 (describing the ten scenarios,
none of which involved such discrimination). Five scenarios did involve
apartments, but the bases of discrimination were, respectively, familial status
(#1), disability (#2 and #4), and religion (#3 and #5). Id. at 9. The two
scenarios that did involve race and/or national origin dealt with sales
situations: one (#6) where home sales were restricted to whites; and the other
(#7) where a sales agent limits a client's search to white neighborhoods. Id.
144. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
145. Cf ABRAVANEL, supra note 11, at 9, 14 (reporting that, as for the
general public's knowledge in 2005 of two race-based sales discrimination
scenarios, only fifty-eight percent correctly answered that one was illegal,
while eighty-one percent correctly answered that the other was illegal). It
certainly seems possible that some "Mrs. Murphy"-type landlords, see supra
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event, the HUD studies on what people know about the FHA offer
little help in explaining why rental discrimination based on race
and national origin continues at such high levels.
Because we know so little about why landlords discriminate
on the basis of race and national origin, we cannot know what
policies will be effective in reducing such discrimination. For
decades, fair housing enforcement professionals have assumed
that heightened compliance with the FHA would eventually be
achieved through increased litigation and similar enforcement
techniques." 6 In the 1990s, two distinguished law professors wrote
separate commentaries on the continuing nature of housing
discrimination, but their proposals for remedying this problem
(i.e., more private litigation and/or enhanced FHA damage
awards) have not caught on.147 Meanwhile, government officials
and private FHA litigants continue to proclaim that their latest
lawsuit will "send a strong message" to potential discriminators.'48
note 27 and accompanying text, might mistakenly believe that their exemption
from the FHA allows them to discriminate against blacks and Hispanics, even
though such behavior is barred by the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See supra text
accompanying notes 29-31.
146. See, e.g., infra note 148 and accompanying text.
This was also
Congress's assumption when it strengthened the enforcement mechanisms of
the FHA in the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act. See supra text
accompanying notes 33-35.
147. In her 1999 article, Professor Engel suggested that "we can increase
compliance with the fair housing laws" by recognizing a new type of
compensable injury in FHA cases that she called "lost access to community"
damages. Engel, supra note 55, at 1168, 1198. Two years earlier, Professor
Selmi concluded that "government's enforcement efforts have largely failed,"
and he advocated "legislative efforts ensuring that [FHA] cases are sufficiently
lucrative to attract private counsel" (e.g., by providing treble damage awards,
as is done in antitrust cases). Selmi, supra note 46, at 1438, 1452-56, 1459.
Cf.Martin J. Katz, The FundamentalIncoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 540 (2006)
(suggesting a bounty system for better enforcement of employment
discrimination laws).
148. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice
Department Reaches Settlement with Mississippi Landlords for Housing
Discrimination Against African Americans (May 23, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/May/02 crt_ 310.htm
(quoting
Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., as saying: "This
settlement sends the message that landlords who discriminate on the basis of
race will pay a heavy price."); Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
Riverside, California Landlords pay $390,000 to Settle Justice Department
Housing Bias Lawsuit (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/opa/pr/2002/August02 crt-451.htm (quoting Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., as saying: "This agreement makes clear that
individuals who engage in unlawful housing discrimination, and the people
who employ them, will be held accountable for the harm they cause."); Press
Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Sues Three
Parsippany Apartment Complexes for Allegedly Discriminating Against
African Americans (June 21, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
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But, as described above, rental discrimination rates have
remained pretty much the same over time regardless of how many
FHA suits are brought. 9 In other words, there is no evidence that
such lawsuits change discriminatory rental practices; in fact, reallife experience suggests that they do not.
We simply do not know what might best encourage landlords
to behave in nondiscriminatory ways. Until more is known about
what actually motivates landlords to obey or disobey the FHA, the
compliance rationale for further FHA 15litigation
against such
0
housing providers is just wishful thinking.
The rest of this Article explores lessons from other fields that
might provide some insight into these issues. The goal is to
examine how laws generally, and fair housing laws in particular,
induce their targets to change behavior and what other factors

opa/pr/1999/June/264cr.htm (quoting Acting Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights Bill Lann Lee as saying: "Today's actions should warn all housing
providers that housing discrimination is no longer immune to detection."); see
also Otto J. Hetzel, Remediation Techniques for Racial Housing
Discrimination- An Introduction to the Symposium, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1461,
1463 (2005) ("Substantial monetary judgments... provide a significant
deterrent effect... in the enforcement of the Fair Housing laws.").
149. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.
150. There are, of course, other rationales for FHA litigation. One is to
compensate the victims of housing discrimination. Cf Act of Jan. 3, 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-191, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 584-85 (noting that "the
dual purpose of private enforcement of Title VII" includes "mak[ing] whole the
individual victims of unlawful discrimination" as well as advancing the
national interest in achieving a discrimination-free workplace).
The
individual-compensation rationale would remain a legitimate justification,
even if the compliance-achieving rationale did not exist. Cf Gary T. Schwartz,
Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42
UCLA L. REV. 377, 441-42 (1994) (noting that "the compensation that tort law
furnishes to the accident victim" is an important benefit independent of the
goal of deterrence). The problem with compensation as a justification for FHA
litigation, however, is that it is so haphazard, with a few victims being
compensated through litigation (and some, through punitive damage awards,
being more than fully compensated), while the vast majority of victims do not
litigate and receive nothing. Cf Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change
in PersonalInjury Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2403, 2430 (2000) (concluding, with
respect to the overall tort system, "that for some victims the system works
fine, but for most it does not"); Schwartz, supra, at 378 (noting the primacy of
deterrence as a rationale for modern tort rules).
An additional rationale for FHA litigation might be to provide the
"stories" that are needed to push public attitudes toward more universal
acceptance of the nondiscrimination-in-housing principle. Cf. Sugarman,
supra, at 2425, 2432 (noting first the value in torts scholarship of the "case
study" approach in which a particular case is examined "to understand what
our personal injury law is about through the lens of a single problem," and
second the "social benefits that may be achieved by tort law" such as satisfying
"our collective need to identify and assign blame for wrongdoing when fellow
members of society are hurt by that misconduct").
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might affect racial and national origin discrimination in housing
rentals.
V. LESSONS FROM OTHER FIELDS ABOUT WHY PEOPLE (SUCH AS
LANDLORDS) OBEY LAWS (SUCH AS THE FAIR HOUSING ACT)

In this Part, I seek to draw lessons from psychology,
economics, and other social sciences that might provide clues as to
why people in the United States choose to obey or not obey laws.
As such, this is an effort by one not trained in these fields - and
therefore admittedly rudimentary - to see if other disciplines
might offer useful insights into how landlords' behavior could be
more effectively influenced to comply with the race-based
commands of the Nation's fair housing laws.
A. Law and Deterrence Generally
We begin with some general observations about the law's
ability to deter undesirable behavior, a topic that has been written
about throughout history,"' but about which surprisingly little is
actually known. The foundation for much of our modern thinking
is Jeremy Bentham, who wrote over two centuries ago that people,
being rational evaluators of the costs and benefits of their
contemplated actions and desirous of maximizing pleasure and
minimizing pain, will be more effectively deterred from a course of
action to the extent that punishment for that behavior is
increased."'
As reasonable as this notion seems, there is precious little
empirical evidence to support it. Indeed, in recent decades, a
number of legal scholars have challenged it based on real-life
experiences in the criminal and tort law fields. For example, a
1988 article on Tennessee laws raising sanctions for certain crimes
concluded - after a detailed statistical analysis comparing that
state's subsequent experience to those of nearby states without
such increased sanctions - that the Tennessee changes had not
been successful in reducing crime rates. 3 Deterrence in tort law..
151. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 19:18-20 (New International Version 1984)
(calling for punishment of those who give false witness and predicting that
"the rest of the people will hear of this, and be afraid, and never again will
such an evil thing be done among you").
152. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 (Free Press 1970) (1789). Bentham's views thus
form the foundation for much of how modem economic theory sees people and
their reactions to legal sanctions, a topic that is explored further infra Part
V.D.1.
153. George C. Thomas III & David Edelman, An Evaluation of Conservative
Crime Control Theology, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123, 125-26, 158 (1988). A
similar disconnect between stronger sanctions and deterrence has been
observed in other areas of criminal behavior. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares,
Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191,
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- whose analogy to fair housing is supported by the Supreme
Court's determination to treat FHA violations as torts 55 - has
also been the subject of a number of modern empirical studies.
Some of these were reviewed in a 1994 article by Professor
Schwartz, who focused particularly on experiences in the auto
liability and medical malpractice systems and concluded that tort
rules in these areas provided some, though not optimal, deterrence
against these kinds of negligently inflicted injuries."' Looking at
the same data, however, other scholars have been less convinced of
the deterrent value of personal injury suits in making for "safer
drivers or better doctors."'57
Overall, these modern efforts to determine the extent to
which people are actually deterred by legal sanctions suggest that
we should, at the very least, be skeptical of assuming that
Bentham's simplistic view of deterrence applies in the fair housing
field.lu
Certainly, these studies suggest that the heightened
sanctions introduced by the 1988 amendments to the FHA should
not have been seen as a panacea for the noncompliance problems
that had long plagued this law.

192, 212 (1998) (discussing a 1969 study about juvenile delinquency whose
authors "doubted the efficacy of deterrence models driven by formal sanctions"
and noting, with respect to drug crimes, that "[tihe little empirical work on the
topic suggests that tough sanctions do little to deter those who already have
offended from offending again").
154. Professor Schwartz has described the basic deterrence theory in tort
law as follows: "By imposing the threat of liability on tortious conduct, the law
can discourage parties from engaging in that conduct." Schwartz, supra note
150, at 381.
155. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974).
156. See Schwartz, supra note 150. It is worth noting here that, unlike the
negligent torts examined by Professor Schwartz, the vast majority of FHA
rental claims are based on intentional conduct. See infra notes 255-56 and
accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 150, at 2431-32 (noting that "empirical
studies of the influence of personal injury law," though becoming more
sophisticated, "are extremely difficult to carry out in a convincing manner"
and concluding that "the jury is still out on this issue [of the deterrence value
of tort law]"). For an earlier and more detailed explanation of Professor
Sugarman's belief that tort law is ineffective as a deterrent and in particular
his view that theorists who believe otherwise have no convincing empirical
support for their position, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort
Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 559-91 (1985).
158. See also Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of
Class Action Employment DiscriminationLitigationand Its Effects, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1249, 1332 (2003) (concluding, based on an empirical study of 1991-2001
Title VII class action lawsuits showing that such suits caused little change in
the defendant companies' value or employment policies, that "we should not
rely on [class action] litigation to eliminate or deter discrimination").
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B. Basic PsychologicalInsights into Punishment and Deterrence
Psychologists know a good deal about the deterrent effect of
punishment. The first lesson here is that punishment is generally
a less effective way to change undesirable behavior than is
rewarding desirable
behavior
("positive reinforcement").
Obviously, legal sanctions, such as monetary judgments in civil
cases, focus primarily on the former, so it is sometimes hard for
law-trained people to imagine how positive reinforcement for
potential defendants could be accomplished. Nevertheless, in the
quest for more FHA compliance, it seems worthwhile at least to
consider what positive rewards might be possible for law-abiding
landlords, even if these rewards are to be generated from outside
the legal system.160
As for more traditional enforcement techniques (i.e.,
punishment), basic insights from psychological studies suggest
why the FHA enforcement system has failed to achieve better
compliance. Such studies establish that, in general, four factors
are relevant in determining whether a punishment will be
effective in changing behavior: (1) severity; (2) immediacy; (3)
consistency; and (4) offsetting motivational factors."'
With respect to the severity of punishment, it is known that
specified undesirable behavior (e.g., a child running into the
street) will be stopped more reliably if punishment is introduced
suddenly and is strong enough to be very unpleasant. Starting out
159. See, e.g., Stephen C. Cooper, The Carrotand the Stick, 82-JAN MICH. B.
J. 20, 23 (2003) (discussing usefulness of rewards and positive reinforcement
as a means of promoting desirable behaviors); Jennifer Marie Sanchez,
Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Due Process in the Juvenile Parole Revocation
Process: An Arizona Illustration, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 11, 119 (2005)
(asserting that the efficacy of positive reinforcement as opposed to punishment
is a "basic psychological principle that should be imported into the legal
system").
160. In the 1990s, HUD entered into "Best Practices" agreements with some
industry groups, such as the National Association of Realtors and the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America, although these apparently did not
include rental groups. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., BUILDING
COMMUNITIES AND NEW MARKETS FOR THE NEW CENTURY: 1998
CONSOLIDATED REPORT 72 (1999).
More recently, HUD has occasionally made "Fair Housing Best
Practices" awards, see HUD Homes & Communities, Two Tennessee
Organizations Receive Fair Housing Best Practices Awards for Innovative
Programs,
http://www.hud.gov/localltn/community/fhsgawards.cfm
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2007) (reporting on two such awards in 2002), although again
none seem to have been made to any landlords or their trade groups. See Hud
User, Ongoing Research, HUD Secretary's Awards, http://www.huduser.org/
research/secaward.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2007) (describing current HUD
awards).
161. See, e.g., W. DAVID PIERCE & W. FRANK EPLING, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
AND LEARNING 235-44 (1995). This source is the basis for the discussion in
this and the following two paragraphs of the text.
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with mild penalties that are gradually increased work less well; in
these circumstances, people tend to keep doing the unwanted
behavior until the punishment gets very severe. In fact, high
intensity punishment for the first offense is best for completely
If people receive only moderate
stopping the behavior.
punishment, they may stop for a while, but start up again later.
With respect to the other factors, immediacy deals with the
concept that punishment works better when it follows the behavior
closely in time. As for consistency, punishment works best if it
occurs every time the undesirable behavior occurs. The rarer the
punishment, the less effective it is."2 A related principle is that
each time a person engages in the specified behavior and suffers
no negative consequences, the person becomes more likely to
Finally, as to other
engage in that behavior in the future.'
motivations, studies show that if a behavior has strong reinforcers
(e.g., people really like doing it or get some other valuable result
from doing it), more punishment is required to get them to stop
because the punishment has to override the positive consequences
they experience from the behavior; a related insight is that people
will stop undesirable behavior more readily if they have some
alternative way of getting the reward it provides.
Conceding that today's landlords are not a single organism
and that they are not even the same individuals whose behavior
the FHA first sought to change four decades ago, these principles
still seem relevant in explaining why the FHA's "punishments" for
race-based rental discrimination have not worked very well.
While these punishments have been severe in a few cases, they
have now been around for a long time, and landlords know they
are not applied very consistently or with any immediacy. Short of
a new and unprecedented national commitment designed to
guarantee that FHA violations are punished severely,
immediately, and consistently - a highly unlikely prospect these psychological insights suggest that FHA enforcement will
162. Cf.Meares, supra note 153, at 212 (speculating, with respect to drug
crimes, that "[olne reason tough sanctions may be associated with low levels of
specific deterrence is that despite a high lifetime likelihood of arrest, the
probability that an individual will be caught committing a particularoffense is
incredibly low" (citing a study of 254 crack dealers showing that eighty-seven
percent of them had been arrested at some time, but that the chance of arrest
for each particular offense was less than one percent)). Given the high
number of race-based violations of the FHA and the relatively low number of
FHA claims challenging such violations, see, respectively, supra note 14 and
Part II.B, the likelihood that a landlord who engages in such a violation will
be sued is even less than the one percent figure cited by Professor Meares for
crack dealers.
163. See, e.g., JONATHAN L. FREEDMAN ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 243 (4th

ed. 1981); see also id. at 243-45 (discussing modeling theory, which suggests
that if some people seem to be "getting away with" specified behavior, others

will likely follow suit).
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continue to have little effect on changing landlords' behavior.
Furthermore, to the extent landlords continue to have reasons for
engaging in racial discrimination - reasons that even they may
not be entirely conscious of6' - they will also presumably continue
to see no obvious alternatives for obtaining these benefits.
C. Why Do People Obey Laws?
Of course, people do not obey laws simply out of a fear that
disobedience will result in swift and sure punishment.1 6 5 Again,
however, surprisingly little is actually known about what does
motivate compliance with the law. One of the few empirical
studies on this subject was conducted in Chicago in the late 1980s.
It involved hundreds of randomly selected citizens whose attitudes
about traffic laws and their enforcement were examined.'" The
study concluded that viewing peoples' behavior as "motivated by
self-interest," and therefore seeing compliance in terms of how to
manipulate behavior "through the control of punishments and
incentives," is inadequate. 167 Rather, people focus on "normative
issues," such as "the legitimacy of legal authorities and the
morality of the law."'" In other words, people's willingness to obey
a law despite countervailing personal costs is a function of their
perceptions of the moral value of that particular law and of how
the legal system enforces it.
The Chicago study suggests that landlords will be more likely
to obey the FHA if it reflects values that are seen as moral in their
content and as legitimate in the sense that they are supported by a
consensus within the rental community. Historically, housing

164. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (describing economic
reasons for landlords to discriminate); infra notes 232-45 and accompanying
text (describing how people may discriminate for reasons they are not
consciously aware of).
165. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 150, at 2431 (implying that other
factors lead to desirable behavior by noting, with respect to tort law, "that for

the threat of liability to matter it would have to achieve desirable
improvements in safety beyond those which would have occurred anyway").
166. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 8-9 (1990).
167. Id. at 165.
168. Id. at 165-66, 168. "People are more responsive to normative judgment
and appeals than is typically recognized by legal authorities.
Their
responsiveness leads people to evaluate laws ... in normative terms, obeying
the law if it is legitimate and moral." Id. at 178. Furthermore:
[Pleople's normative attitudes matter, influencing what they think and
do. The image of the person resulting from these findings is one of a
person whose attitudes and behavior are influenced to an important
degree by social values about what is right and proper. This image
differs strikingly from that of the self-interest models which dominate

current thinking in law, psychology, political science, sociology, and
organization theory, and which need to be expanded.
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professionals have not been strong supporters of fair housing laws,
but there is some evidence that their views have grown more
positive in recent times."' In any event, achieving consensus
within the landlord community that the FHA's nondiscrimination
commands are right and proper would be a major step toward
more voluntary compliance.
D. Economics
1. ClassicalEconomics
The principles of modern market-driven economic analysis
("classical economics") are based on Bentham's basic view of how
people respond to rewards and punishments. The best known
writer on the interplay between such economic principles and the
law is Judge Richard Posner, whose influential book, Economic
Analysis of Law, 7 ' was published five years after the passage of
the 1968 FHA and is now in its sixth edition. 7' Economics, as
explained by Posner, is "the science of rational choice," and it
views people as "rational maximizers" of their "satisfactions."'72
This means, among other things, that people respond to
incentives, so that "if a person's surroundings change in such a
way that he could increase his satisfactions by altering his
Thus, for example, economic analysis
behavior, he will do so."'
"predict[s] that an increase in either the severity of the
punishment or the likelihood of its imposition will raise the price
of crime and therefore reduce its incidence."'74
As noted earlier, this prediction does not always correspond
with real world experience, 75 and to read Posner on civil rights is
indeed to enter a fantasy world. His basic conclusion is that,
because market participants with the least prejudice have a
competitive advantage over those who discriminate, economic
169. This has at least been true for realtors. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 19, at 208-09 (noting how the National Association of Realtors
shifted from a position of hostility to fair housing in the early 1980s to working
in support of the 1988 amendments that strengthened the FHA). Whether the
same can be said for landlords is less certain, in part because landlords lack a
national organization that speaks as clearly for them as the NAR does for
realtors.
170. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003).

171. Though not an economist himself, Posner is well-schooled in the work of
professional economists, and his book relies particularly on the work of Gary
S. Becker. See, e.g., id. at xx n.6 (citing GARY S. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY
(1971)); id. at xxi (identifying Becker and four others as "economists who have
most shaped my thinking about economics"); id. at 3 (citing GARY S. BECKER,
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)).

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
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forces will on their own "tend to minimize discrimination." 76
Posner recognizes that some people have a "taste for
discrimination," that is, they are willing to pay a price to avoid
associating with other races, by, for example, refusing "to sell their
house to blacks who are willing to pay higher prices than white
purchasers."'77 This means, according to Posner, that providers
with the least prejudice will have lower costs and will therefore
ultimately "come to dominate the market." 8 This basic theory has
led Posner and like-minded scholars to conclude that Title VI 17 the federal employment discrimination law passed four years
before the FHA - is generally an unnecessary intrusion into free
labor markets.18
With respect to housing, Posner believes that such economic
principles explain why "there has been general compliance with
laws forbidding people to refuse on racial grounds to sell real
estate." 8' No authority is cited to support this rosy view of FHA
compliance. 8 ' The fact that Posner's later editions repeat this
176. POSNER, supra note 170, at 682. Posner recognizes that market forces
will not completely end discrimination, because he sees some types of
discrimination as "efficient." Id. An example of efficient discrimination would
be using race as a proxy to reduce the cost of obtaining information, as when
race "is positively correlated with the possession of undesired
characteristics ... it is rational for people to use th[is] attribute as a proxy for
the underlying characteristic." Id. at 689; see also infra notes 217-18 and
accompanying text (describing the economic rationale for using race-based
proxies in obtaining information).
177. POSNER, supra note 170, at 681. The "taste for discrimination" idea
seems to have originated with Professor Becker. See GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971) ("If an individual has a 'taste
for discrimination,' he must act as if he were willing to pay something, either
directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some persons
instead of others.").
178. POSNER, supra note 170, at 682.
179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -2000e-17 (2000).
180. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBmDEN GROUND: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAwS (1995); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (1989). See
generally BECKER, supra note 177.
However, according to a recent
commentator, "[tihe argument ... that an unimpeded labor market will tend
to correct for employment discrimination on its own has been largely
discredited." Danielle Tarantolo, From Employment to Contract:Section 1981
and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116
YALE L.J. 170, 203 n.194 (2006) (citing, inter alia, John J. Donohue III,
Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment DiscriminationLaws, 44
STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1592-96 (1992) (summarizing empirical research on Title
VII's impact on black workers)).
181. POSNER, supra note 170, at 686-87.
182. See id. Posner's theory is that, since white sellers won't stay in the
neighborhood and thus will have little "associational costs" inhibiting their
sales to black purchasers, they have no reason to discriminate. Id. at 687.
Posner does not consider the possibility that homeowners' real estate agents
may have economic incentives to discriminate, although other economists have
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phrase without showing any awareness of HUD's intervening
studies showing ongoing high levels of sales discrimination against
black home buyers" underscores how detached from reality his
analysis is. As for housing rentals, Posner recognizes that the ongoing nature of the landlord-tenant relationship means that
prejudiced landlords will incur some "associational costs" that
make their discrimination "rational," and he added to later
editions this observation: "Most housing-discrimination cases,
therefore, involve rentals rather than sales.""
As we have seen, Posner is correct that discrimination is more
common in rentals than sales,"n but his belief that the reason for
this is the difference in "associational costs" seems misguided. The
HUD studies show that rental discrimination by agents, not live-in
landlords, has continued virtually unabated; there may be
economic incentives for such behavior," but the explanation
cannot lie in the agents' "associational costs."
Furthermore, even as to individual landlords with ongoing
tenant contacts, Posner's economic principles would suggest wrongly, it has turned out - that market forces will drive out
prejudiced landlords. These principles hold that landlords who
refuse to deal with minorities will thereby narrow their market,
resulting in an inability to command rents as high as their less
prejudiced
competitors. Therefore, bigoted landlords will
eventually be driven out of the market or, as rational decisionmakers, will sell their apartment buildings to nondiscriminating
owners and invest the proceeds where their personal prejudices do
not interfere with maximizing financial gain.'87 The trouble with
this theory, of course, is that it fails to describe the reality of
ongoing rental discrimination, as reflected in HUD's three

explored this matter, see supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text, and
Posner has elsewhere conceded that brokers may engage in what he calls
"irrational" discrimination. See Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521,
1532 (7th Cir. 1990) (positing the view that it would be "irrational" for real
estate agents to engage in the discriminatory practice of racial steering
because this would limit their markets and thus reduce their commissions, but
acknowledging that real-life experience suggests that some realtors do steer,
i.e., behave irrationally under Posner's theory).
183. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
184. POSNER, supra note 170, at 687.
185. See supra notes 6-9, 11-12, 48 and accompanying text; supra text
accompanying notes 69 and 80.
186. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
187. For an example of a prominent economist's exposition of this theory, see
Richard F. Muth, HistoricPerspectives:InstitutionalDiscriminationand Other
Causal Theories, discussed in THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS

33, 41 (Robert G. Schwemm, ed., 1989) (explaining Professor Muth's view that
people will not act against their own economic interests for long periods of

time).
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national studies, even more so than it does with respect to sales
discrimination.
As with sales discrimination, some economists have tried to
adjust Posner's simplified model by identifying elements of the
rental market that provide economic incentives for housing
providers to discriminate. For example, a nonbiased landlord
might, for purely economic reasons, refuse to rent to minorities 18if
he perceives that his white tenants will respond by moving out.
But, as we have seen, the HUD studies do not support this as a
8 9
basis for rental discrimination."
2. Reality-OrientedEconomists
Some economists have shown an awareness that purely
financial incentives do not describe the real world of American
race relations. 9 ' Perhaps the most prominent is Nobel Laureate
Kenneth Arrow, who observed as early as 1972 that classical
economic theory's approach to racial discrimination was simply to
predict "the absence of the phenomenon it was designed to
explain." 9' A quarter century later, Arrow began an article
entitled What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?
by noting that discrimination continued to "pervade every aspect"
of American society." This article describes the empirical record
of continuing discrimination as "decisive" and finds the testing
studies showing differential treatment in housing to be
"[elspecially striking."'93 Arrow points out an obvious truth: that
"any theory of racial discrimination, including any theory of its
economic implications, has to be consistent with these patent
facts."94 He concludes that, because the market-based theory's

188. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 21718 and accompanying text (describing the economic rationale for using racebased proxies in lieu of more expensively obtained information).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
190. A number of law professors have also written about the failure of
classical economic theory to explain racial discrimination. See, e.g., Steven A.
Ramirez, What We Teach When We Teach About Race: The Problem of Law
and Pseudo-Economics, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365 (2004); Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and
Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
Markets Don't Stop Discrimination,8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y J. 22 (1991); see also
infra note 214, 2.
191. Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Mathematical Models of Race Discrimination
in the Labor Market, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 187, 192
(Anthony H. Pascal, ed., 1972).
192. Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial
Discrimination?,12 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (1998).
193. Id. at 93.
194. Id. at 92. Judge Posner agrees that "[an important test of a theory is
its ability to explain reality," but believes that "Ljludged by the test of
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tendency "to predict that racial discrimination will be eliminated"
has been proven wrong, "we must seek elsewhere for non-market
factors influencing economic behavior." 195
Arrow notes that modern economists have recognized for
some time that "beliefs and expectations influence economic
behavior.""
He concludes that social interaction and networks
could play a role in explaining racial discrimination, 97 and he
suggests that "beliefs and preferences may themselves be the
product of social interactions unmediated by prices and
markets."'9 8 Arrow finds race preferences and social networks
helpful in explaining employment discrimination - where it is
"easy to say how social segregation can give rise to labor market
segregation through network referrals"'" - but "perhaps less so
for housing." °°
Arrow insists that market-based theories for housing
discrimination are even less satisfactory than for employment
discrimination because, for sellers of houses and mortgages, "[iit is
hard to think of any market-based explanation for refusal to
sell.""°' Arrow thus concluded his 1998 paper without identifying a
satisfactory theory for housing discrimination, but he did maintain
that, in housing as well as employment:
[E]ach transaction is a social event. The transactors bring to it a
whole set of social attitudes which would be irrelevant in the market
model ....Direct social transactions unmediated by a market play
a role. Even the market manifestations will be altered by these
direct social influences. 2
3. BehavioralEconomics
In recent decades, a group of "behavioral economists" have
sought to address the disconnect between real-world results and
those predicted by classical economic theory by learning more

explanatory power, economic theory is a significant (although only partial)
success." POSNER, supra note 170, at 17.
195. Arrow, supra note 192, at 93.
196. Id. at 96.
197. Id. at 97.
198. Id. at 97.
199. Id. at 98. Thus, in labor markets, "[d]iscrimination no longer has any
cost to the discriminator; indeed, it has social rewards. Profit maximization is
overcome by the values inherent in the maintenance of the network or other
social interaction." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 95-96.
202. Id. at 98; see also id. at 97 ("[T]he very fact of segregation will reinforce
beliefs in racial differences" (citing Warren Whatley & Gavin Wright, Race,
Human Capital, and Labour Markets in American History, in LABOUR
MARKET EVOLUTION (George Grantham & Mary MacKinnon, eds., 1994))).
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Two
about how and why people actually make choices." 3
prominent examples are Richard Thaler, a University of Chicago
economics professor, and Daniel Kahneman, a Princeton
psychology professor and the 2002 Nobel Laureate in economics,
both of whom began decades ago to show that people are not the
efficient profit-maximizers that the traditional theory assumed,
but are prone to emotion and error even in their financial decisionmaking."4 Thaler, Kahneman, and other behaviorists have not
only shown that people occasionally make economically
but that these "anomalies" fall into
"irrational" choices,2" '
recognizable and predictable patterns, that is, we "err in a
systematic direction."2"
One example is that people have a bias in favor of the status
quo (i.e., we prefer things to stay relatively the same).0 7 Another

203. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism", 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1211, 1214-18 (2003) (summarizing developments in behavioral economics
over the past two decades); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998) (surveying behavioral economics literature); see
also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (applying
behavioral economics principles to various legal issues).
204. Examples of Thaler's work include RICHARD H. THALER, QUASIRATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE:
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1991); see also Richard H.
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Public Policy, and
Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 176 (2003) (reporting on research that
"over the past three decades has raised questions about the rationality of the
judgments and decisions that individuals make").
Examples of Kahneman's work include Daniel Kahneman, Maps of
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 1449 (2003); Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 162 (2003).
Thaler and Kahneman have co-authored numerous papers together.
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility
Maximization and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 1221 (2006);
sources cited infra notes 207, 210.
205. Thaler and some of his colleagues now resist using the word "irrational"
to describe the behavior they have identified, believing that "it is not useful
and is likely to mislead. We do far better to specify how human beings
actually behave (and depart from the conventional theory) than to argue
whether they are 'irrational."' Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1593, 1594 (1998).
206. Id. at 1599.
207. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193
(1991); William Samuelson & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Status Quo in Decisionmaking, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); see also Gary Blasi & John T.
Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal
Advocacy, and Social Science, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1126-32 (2006) (describing
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is that people are generally "loss averse" (i.e., we are motivated
more by fear of loss than by the prospect of gain).2" A third is that
our decision-making is affected by how choices are worded or
presented, a concept known as "framing.""° In these and certain
other predictable ways, people have been shown to make choices
that do not maximize their financial well-being, but rather reflect
a desire for fairness,210 an allegiance to social norms, 1' and certain
other factors.'12
Explaining why people systematically make decisions that do
not maximize their self-interest is a question that is currently
being addressed by researchers in a variety of fields, including
psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology.213 However
this question is ultimately resolved, it is clear to these researchers
that human decision-making is not driven entirely by economic
forces.214
studies showing that people value the status quo and speculating about why
the appeal of the status quo is so great).
208. See, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 207; Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Rick, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
209. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGEMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds., 2002);
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, eds.,
2000).
210. See, e.g., Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1135-36 (2000); Ernest Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory
of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817 (1999); Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a Constrainton
Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986);
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUSINESS 285 (1986).
211. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 210, at 1127-31.
212. Actual decision-making is thus seen by behaviorists as being "bounded"
by factors other than self-interest. According to Thaler and his colleagues,
three separate "bounds" on the way people actually behave that depart from
the standard economic model have been identified: (1) bounded rationality
(i.e., the need, given the limits on human cognitive abilities, to rely on what
are sometimes inaccurate heuristics ("rules of thumb")); (2) bounded willpower
(i.e., engaging in short-term pleasures, such as smoking and eating rich foods,
that people know are bad for them); and (3) bounded self-interest (e.g., caring
about strangers or about being treated fairly). Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra
note 205, at 1476-79.
213. See, e.g., John Cassidy, Mind Games: What Neuroeconomics Tells Us
About Money and the Brain, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 18, 2006, at 30,
(describing how neuroscience has spawned a new field of "neuroeconomics"
whose practitioners are addressing this question); supra notes 204, 2, 207-09
(citing works by the psychologist Daniel Kahneman); infra note 214,
1
(referring to evolutionary biology).
214. Judge Posner, on behalf of traditional theory, has criticized the
behavioralists' approach as providing merely a psychological critique of
economic analysis rather than a theoretical construct that can predict
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The behavioralists' work has generally focused on financial
decision-making, but Boston University economist, Glenn C.
Loury, applied some of their insights to racial issues in a 2002
book.2" Loury's book does not address housing discrimination per
se, but it does make a number of generalizations about how
decision-makers act in race-based ways, one example being a

behavior, although he does note that rational-choice economics has become
more sophisticated in its understanding of human behavior by incorporating
principles from other fields, and he argues that the insights of evolutionary
biology may be particularly helpful. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1558-59, 1561-62,
1567 (1998).
For the behaviorists' response to Posner's critique, see Jolls, Sunstein &
Thaler, supra note 205, at 1594-1605 (noting, inter alia at 1600, that the
insights that help explain particular forms of non-profit-maximizing behavior
"have come more from psychology than biology"); see also Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 210, at 1072-73 (recognizing that, "[t]o be useful for legal policy,
behavioral theories need to predict (with reasonable success) the likely
responses to legal rules of the particular classes of actors to whom the rules
are geared," and that "[tihere is no doubt that a single, universally applicable
theory of behavior is convenient and highly desirable," but arguing that "if
universality is inconsistent with sophistication and realism, legal policy
makers are better off foregoing universality and, instead, creating a collection
of situation-specific minitheories useful in the analysis of discrete legal
problems").
Basically, the behaviorists maintain, like Professor Arrow, see Arrow,
supra note 192, at 98 (recognizing that market-based models of racial
discrimination "get at only part of the story"), that the classical economic
model is not entirely wrong, but rather is misleading when regarded as a
perfect, all-encompassing description. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 210, at
1144 ("[W]e do not argue that the edifice of rational choice theory ...be ripped
down. Rather, we suggest that it be revised."). Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler,
supra note 205, at 1475, 1487, maintain:
Behavioral economics is a form of economics, and our goal is to
strengthen the predictive and analytic power of law and economics, not
to undermine it. ... The project of behavioral law and economics, as we
see it, is to take the core insights and successes of economics and build
upon them by making more realistic assumptions about human
behavior.
Similarly, neuroeconomics, according to one of its leading advocates, Harvard
Professor David Laibson:
[I]sn't a wholesale rejection of the traditional methodology .... It is just
a recognition that decision-making is not always perfect. People try to
do the best they can, but they sometimes make mistakes. The idea that
a single mechanism maximizes welfare and always gets things right that concept is on the rocks. But models that I call "cousins" of the
rational-actor model will survive.
Cassidy, supra note 213, at 37.
215. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (Harvard Univ.

Press, 2002). Like other behaviorists, Loury concludes that "[wie cannot hope
to explain all of human behavior with a cost-benefit calculus," and that "it is
futile to look for 'rationality' at the foundation of all social action." Id. at 43-
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landlord's decision whether to rent to a particular applicant. 16
Loury posits that decision-makers, hungry for information, are
constantly searching for "clues that can equip them to make wiser
choices""7 and that classifying other humans is thus a "universal
practice ... that lies at the root of all social-cognitive behavior."" '
Further, he contends that an "awareness of the racial 'otherness' of
blacks is embedded in the social consciousness of the American
21 9
nation owing to the historical fact of slavery and its aftermath."
Thus, using racial stereotypes to evaluate others is deeply
ingrained in everyone in the United States.2 Furthermore, Loury
shows that the use of such stereotypes will eventually have the
effect of confirming their truth; for example, a lender with a
negative view of blacks may think that, on average, "loans to
blacks pose a greater risk of default" and, over time, such thinking
will result in this view being confirmed.22
216. Id. at 18.
217. Id. at 17. The "economic" rationale for this phenomenon has been
described as follows:
[W]hen individuals encounter [and have to judge] a stranger ....[g]iven
the scarcity of information, it is rational to use cheaper information proxies - to infer the existence of more expensive, individualized
information. The economics literature describes the use of proxies for
making decisions of material consequence (such as employment) ....
Shared-trait group membership [such as race] is a proxy people use for
granting or withholding esteem to individuals they do not know
personally.
McAdams, supra note 190, at 1021 (footnote omitted).
218. LOURY, supra note 215, at 18-19; see also id. at 57 (describing "the
forming of generalizations based on superficial physical traits by decisionmaking agents" as a "nearly universal practice").
219. Id. at 5.
220. Loury notes that such attitudes may be held by blacks themselves
("nothing... prevents a black from succumbing to the same cognitive biases
as anyone else," id. at 53), and he cites a study showing that Asian and Latino
immigrants are particularly averse to living near blacks. Id. at 90-91
(discussing Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Neighborhood Racial-Composition
Preferences: Evidence from a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 SOC. PROBS. 379
(2000)); see also infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (discussing
favoritism of dominant groups by disadvantaged groups); Paula D. McClain et
al., Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latin Immigrants' Views of Black
Americans, 68 J. POL. 571 (2006) (reporting, based on a 500-person survey in
Durham, North Carolina, that "Latino immigrants hold negative stereotypical
views of blacks and feel that they have more in common with whites than with
blacks").
221. LOURY, supra note 215, at 23-26. The result of this self-confirming
stereotype phenomenon in lending, employment, and other areas is that "[t]he
'social meaning of race' - that is, the tacit understandings associated with
'blackness' in the public's imagination, especially the negative connotations biases the social cognitions and distorts the specifications of observing agents,
inducing them to make causal misattributions detrimental to blacks." Id. at
52.
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Because Loury views the cognitive behavior he describes as
"deep-seated,"222 he is at pains not to criticize it as racism, 23 but he
is also not optimistic that Americans can "control" the instinct to
employ race-based classifications. Loury cites studies showing
that people who must regularly distinguish among large numbers
of blacks do learn to eschew "stereotype-driven behavior and [use]
a more refined set of indices to guide their discrimination,"224 but
he notes that this type of "learning" is less likely to occur when
decision-making occurs only sporadically (e.g., in selecting a
marriage partner
or, as one might assume, in selecting tenants for
25
a year's lease).
For present purposes, one problem with Loury's book is that
he is less concerned with racial discrimination (i.e., how people are
treated) than with racial stigma, which "is about who, at the
deepest cognitive level, they are understood to be."226 He views
"the classic racial discrimination problem" as having "declined
sharply in the United States in the past half-century," 2 7 but this
has not led - and he believes, cannot lead - "to a solution for the
problem of racial economic inequality.",2 He notes that focusing
on discrimination "yields a search for harmful or malicious action
as the treatment, using the law and moral suasion to curtail or
modify those actions," 229 but he argues that "conventional legal
action and moral suasion" can only have a limited role in achieving
the goal of overall racial justice.23 ° For this, he says we need to
challenge racial stigma by coming to believe in the "equal

The same phenomenon has been noted from the perspective of cultural
anthropology. In a 1997 article applying this perspective to the problem of
price discrimination against blacks and women in car sales (documented in
Ayres, supra note 136), Professors Conley and O'Barr conclude that such
discrimination is an example of:
the individual salespeople... inevitably fall[ing] back on widely shared
beliefs and understandings - in other words, on culture ....

[E]ach act

of [discrimination] by an auto salesperson simultaneously reflects and
reinforces the cultural beliefs on which it is premised ....

[In the

manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy, the salesperson's conduct [not only
acts on a cultural stereotype, but] also adds to the strength of the
stereotype.
John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Crime and Custom in CorporateSociety:
A Cultural Perspective on CorporateMisconduct, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
9 (1997) (footnote omitted).
222. LOURY, supra note 215, at 35.
223. See id. at 35, 45, 53-54.
224. Id. at 50.
225. Id. at 51.
226. Id. at 167.
227. Id. at 95.
228. Id. at 101.
229. Id. at 168.
230. Id. at 167-68.
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"
humanity" of blacks.23
' How to achieve such a change in deepseated public attitudes is not, however, made clear. Furthermore,
as we have seen, Loury's assumption that racial discrimination
problems have been largely eliminated is inaccurate, at least in
rental housing.
Overall, therefore, Loury's analysis of the problem of racebased stereotypes in decision-making seems more helpful than his
suggested solution. And, as we shall see in the next section, his
economic understanding of how such stereotyped judgments work
finds support in recent work of psychologists and other social
scientists.

E. PsychologicalStudies of Implicit Bias and
their Implicationsfor DiscriminationLaw
Over the past two decades, studies measuring implicit
attitudes (i.e., those we are not consciously aware of) have
demonstrated that Americans harbor more negative attitudes
toward racial minorities than we realize or are comfortable with.232
This work by social psychologists shows that implicit bias against
blacks and other minorities remains widespread, even as
Americans profess to hold ever more benign attitudes on racial
issues.233
One well-known technique for measuring such bias is the
implicit association test (IAT), which assesses how quickly people
make connections between one factor (e.g., a black or white face)
and a good or bad concept (e.g., words like "wonderful" or "evil").234
The Race IAT has been administered to tens of thousands of
people in the United States, over eighty percent of whom exhibit
an implicit pro-white bias.2"5 These results show that our
231. Id. at 87-90.
232. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social
Cognition:Attitudes, Self-esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).
For an overview of the basic findings of such studies with a focus on how they
relate to racial and gender discrimination, see Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945
(2006).
233. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 nn.12-13 (2006) (citing reviews of
the implicit-bias literature and surveys reporting declines in expressed
attitudes of racism).
234. For a popular description of IAT tests and how they show implicit racial
bias, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT
THINKING, 77-88 (2005). Descriptions of such tests by legal scholars concerned
with discrimination include R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and
Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1182-83,
1186-89 (2006); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 232, at 952-58; Bagenstos,
supra note 233, at 6.
235. GLADWELL, supra note 234, at 84; see also Bagenstos, supra note 233, at
7 (noting that "'[wihite Americans, on average, show strong implicit preference
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unconscious racial attitudes "may be utterly incompatible with our
stated conscious values."23 For example, even people who profess
strongly egalitarian views often exhibit pro-white implicit biases."'
It may not seem surprising that people have a built-in
tendency to favor those who look like themselves over those who
appear different." Indeed, the concept of favoring "ingroup"
members over outsiders seems so natural as to suggest it may
have evolutionary roots.239 In any event, the phenomenon has been
well documented. '
Furthermore, there are psychological

for their own group and relative bias against African Americans" (quoting
Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 147-48 (2004))).

"Similar results have been obtained in terms of White Americans' implicit
attitude toward other ethnic groups such as Latinos." Id.
236. GLADWELL, supra note 234, at 85.
237. See Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 7. According to the American
Psychological Association:
Studies demonstrate that even those who firmly maintain and articulate
explicit attitudes of racial equality and acceptance nevertheless
implicitly harbor a variety of negative feelings about members of other
racial and ethnic groups. See generally [Samuel L. Gaertner & John F.
Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION
AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, eds. 1986)].
Studies focusing specifically on "aversive racism" - that is, racist
prejudice harbored by those who would find it aversive to acknowledge
their racial biases - has [sic] demonstrated that these subconscious
prejudices can trigger discriminatory behavior. See id. It can also
trigger avoidance: that is, people who harbor prejudice - even implicit
prejudice - will often shy away from contact with persons of other
races. See, e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory, [90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751 (2006)].
Brief of Amici Curiae the American Psychological Association and the
Washington State Psychological Association in Support of Respondents at *24,
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and
Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 2006 WL 2927084 (6th Cir.
2007) (No. 05-908, No. 05-915) [hereinafter Psychological Brief].
238. See Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 7 (noting that there is "'plenty of
evidence for the pervasiveness of stereotypic beliefs about outgroups especially
when those outgroups are racial minorities"' (quoting Dasgupta, supra note
235, at 147-48)). For more on how people consistently favor ingroup over
outgroup members, see D. G. PRUITTr & S. H. KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT:
ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT (2004).

239. See, e.g., Benedict Carey, Neurology Study Uncovers a Tendency to
Learn Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES D4 (Aug. 2, 2005) (reporting on a study by
Harvard Psychologist Mahzarin Banaji and others finding that "the sight of a
stranger of another race can prompt a measurable nervous reaction that
probably reflects unconscious biases").
240. By now almost a hundred studies have documented people's tendency to
automatically associate positive characteristics with their ingroups more
easily than outgroups (i.e., ingroup favoritism) as well as their tendency to
associate negative characteristics with outgroups more readily than ingroups
(i.e., outgroup derogation). Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 6 (quoting Dasgupta,
supra note 235, at 146); see also Psychological Brief, supra note 237, at 5
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incentives that sustain prejudiced views toward persons different
from ourselves - such as added ingroup cohesiveness, which
increases the likelihood that a person's needs will be met.241
Further, it is well established that implicit racial bias is reinforced
by racial isolation and reduced by interaction with diverse
242
groups.
Implicit pro-white bias in the United States is so strong that
it often shows up even among blacks; that is, it trumps blacks'
tendency to favor their own ingroup members. Thus, for example,
about half the blacks who have taken the Race IAT have shown
stronger associations with whites than with other blacks.'
In
other words, American blacks "often harbor the same stereotypes
about their own group as [whites] harbor about them."2" As the
popular writer Malcolm Gladwell (himself half black) wrote after
discovering that his own Race IAT scores showed a pro-white bias:
"How could we not? We live in North America, where we are
surrounded
every day by cultural messages linking white with
,5
24
good.
(citing numerous studies supporting the fact that "individuals tend to assign
value to differences between others and the group to which they belong,
developing more favorable attitudes toward 'ingroup' members").
241. See, e.g., Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 4 J. SOC. ISSUES
79, 83-85 (1969).
242. See, e.g., Psychological Brief, supra note 237, at 11 (citing studies
showing that "interaction among members of different groups can be expected
to reduce intergroup prejudice... among both majority and minority group
members"); see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 232, at 964 & n.55
(noting studies showing that personal connections with members of other
races reduce racial bias); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of
Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 981 & n.56 (2006) (citing a "significant body
of social science evidence support[ing] the conclusion that the presence of
population diversity in an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit
bias"); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations,90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006) (finding, in criminal jury
deliberations, that whites are more amenable to discussion of racism when in
racially diverse versus all-white groups and are more lenient toward black
defendants when performing in diverse groups).
243. GLADWELL, supra note 234, at 85.
244. Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 7, n.17 (citing Dasgupta, supra note 235,
at 149); see also Blasi & Jost, supra note 207, at 1121, 1136 (noting that
"numerous studies show that members of disadvantaged groups often prefer
members of other, more advantaged groups" and that "[diozens of studies have
produced evidence of implicit outgroup favoritism among members of
disadvantaged groups").
245. GLADWELL, supra note 234, at 85. Gladwell's instincts here are
confirmed by Professor Mahzarin Banaji, a Harvard psychologist and
prominent IAT researcher, whom Gladwell quotes as follows: "You don't
choose to make positive associations with the dominant group.. . [blut you are
required to. All around you, that group is being paired with good things. You
open the newspaper and you turn on the television, and you can't escape it."
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Because Americans' tendencies to hold prejudiced views
toward racial minorities are often based on cultural sources of
which we are unaware, it seems inevitable that we will make racebased choices, particularly in spontaneous situations, for reasons
we are not fully conscious of. 46 This is not to say that such implicit
racial biases will invariably affect a person's conduct, for 'even
when stereotypes and prejudices are automatically activated,
whether or not they bias behavior depends on how aware people
are of the possibility of bias, how motivated they are to correct
potential bias, and how much control they have over the specific
behavior."'247
Still, to the extent these other factors do not
overcome the built-in tendencies generated by implicit bias, these
psychological studies suggest that, even among people who do not
consider themselves racially prejudiced, biased reactions are not
unusual.24

Id.; see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 232, at 959-60 (discussing why
implicit bias is so pervasive).
246. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 232, at 961 (concluding that
"implicit attitudinal biases are especially important in influencing
nondeliberate or spontaneous discriminatory behaviors"). According to the
American Psychological Association:
Negative thoughts about other racial groups often contribute
unconsciously to prejudiced attitudes. This type of implicit prejudice, in
turn, often manifests itself in discriminatory behavior, anxiety when
dealing with members of other groups, and in avoidance of substantial
interaction with members of other groups.
Psychological Brief, supra note 237, at 7 (citing Gaertner & Dovidio, supra
note 237, and other sources); see also id. at 24 (noting that studies have shown
that "subconscious prejudices can trigger discriminatory behavior" and that
"the 'dominant response' to intergroup anxiety is avoidance"); GLADWELL,
supra note 234, at 85-86 (citing evidence that those having "a strongly prowhite pattern of associations" will be affected in the way they "behave in the
presence of a black person," demonstrating subtle, albeit clearly negative,
differences in body language and speech patterns that, though unconscious,
will tend to throw the personal interaction "hopelessly off course"). But see
Banks et al., supra note 234, at 1187 (concluding that "there is little evidence
that RACE IAT scores correlate with discrimination against African
Americans" and that "evidence linking IAT scores and racially discriminatory
behavior is similarly sparse").
247. Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 9-10 (quoting Dasgupta, supra note 235,
at 157); see also Sommers, supra note 242 (citing studies finding "that
motivations to avoid prejudice lead Whites to a more systematic and thorough
processing of information conveyed by or about Black individuals"). But see
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 232, at 963 (suggesting "caution in assuming
that implicit bias can be reduced merely by increased deliberative effort on a
decision").
248. The phenomenon of "aversive racism," which leads people who believe
in equal opportunity to discriminate against minorities, see supra note 237
and accompanying text, "primarily manifests itself 'when a candidate's
qualifications for the position [are] ambiguous' (i.e., he is neither clearly
qualified nor clearly unqualified).
Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 9 n.30
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The implications of this body of psychological research for
antidiscrimination law are both obvious and discouraging. It
suggests that, even if the FHA were successful in eliminating all
consciously motivated discrimination, a great deal of race-based
discrimination would still occur in rental markets, practiced by
landlords who are not even aware they are disfavoring minority
applicants and who may see themselves as law-abiding housing
providers.249
As Professor Bagenstos recently observed with
respect to employment discrimination law: "There is some question
whether existing antidiscrimination law even prohibits actions
driven by unconscious bias. But even assuming those actions
violate the law as a formal matter, such violations are extremely
difficult to prove.
Unconscious biases 'sneak up' on a
decisionmaker."250
Two decades ago when the implicit-bias studies were
relatively new, their implications for antidiscrimination law were
highlighted in an influential article by Professor Charles
(quoting John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and
Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. Sci. 315, 318 (2000)).
249. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 42-43 ("Discrimination actuated
by implicit bias in not rooted in a set of objectionable values so much as it is
built into the structure of how people's brains make sense of the avalanche of
information they must process.") (footnote omitted); see also id. at 7-8 ("'In a
culture in

which

race ... and ethnicity

are

salient, ....
even

the well-

intentioned will inexorably categorize along racial... and ethnic lines.'"
(quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1217 (1995)); R. A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:
Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 829 (2004)
("[A]ntidiscrimination statutes designed to curb intentional action, as a
practical matter, can have no real impact on automatic responses to racial
difference that we know can compound racial stigma and the negative
meanings associated with race.").
250. Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 8 (footnotes omitted); see also Conley &
O'Barr, supra note 221, at 10 (concluding, with respect to discrimination by
car salespersons that may be based on cultural stereotypes, that "it is hard to
see how the law can deter [this] kind of misconduct... [because] the
individual salespeople have no discriminatory intent, and no awareness of the
results that their conduct is producing"); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I.
Norton, Race-Based Judgment, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental
Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 6, on file with author) (noting
research demonstrating "that people can offer compelling explanations for
their behavior even when unaware of the factors - such as race - that are
actually influential"); id. (manuscript at 8) (describing an experiment
involving hiring for a stereotypical male job that showed "[tihe majority of
participants hired the male applicant regardless of qualifications, yet very few
cited gender as influential" and instead used specious justifications to explain
their choice); id. (manuscript at 21) (reporting on jury-challenge experiments
that demonstrate "the causal effects of race on jury selection and the facility
with which decision-makers can provide race-neutral justifications for
peremptory use").
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Lawrence.25
Noting that psychologists had shown that
unconscious bias is a pervasive aspect of American life,25 Professor
Lawrence advocated an approach to equal protection jurisprudence
based on "a more complete understanding of the nature of human
motivation" and a recognition that "a large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious
racial motivation. "2u
But how can this be done? 2' The FHA outlaws practices
undertaken "because of race"255 and thus generally seeks, like the
Equal Protection Clause, to accomplish its goals only by
eliminating discrimination prompted by conscious prejudice.
Again to quote Professor Bagenstos: "The problem of implicit
bias ...is a prime example... of the limits of a fault-based
antidiscrimination
law....
Unconscious
bias.., generates
inequalities that our current antidiscrimiation law is not well
equipped to solve."257
In the past decade, a number of legal scholars concerned with
employment discrimination have responded to Professor

251. Lawrence, supra note 3.
252. Id. at 336-39.
253. Id. at 322-24.
Professor Lawrence's legal focus was the Equal
Protection Clause, whose protection of racial minorities had been limited by
the Supreme Court a decade earlier in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976), to outlawing only those official acts that had been shown to reflect "a
racially discriminatory purpose," and not also those that had "a racially
disproportionate impact."
254. See Conley & O'Barr, supra note 221, at 11. Conley and O'Barr ask,
presumably rhetorically, with respect to culturally driven discrimination by
car salespersons:
How could the law insist that individual salespeople ignore the cultural
information that they use in negotiating? What would they replace it
with? Would they be required to develop a conscious awareness of their
stereotypes, and then introduce a correction factor? [And what then
about] the law of unintended consequences.
Id.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 26. Some, but not all, of the
FHA's substantive prohibitions use the term "discriminate" to describe the
practices forbidden by the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), (f)(1)-(2), 3605-06.
For an argument that the use of this word in Title VII might be interpreted to
prohibit acts prompted by implicit, as well as conscious, bias, see Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV.
997, 1053-55 (2006).
256. Although the disparate impact theory is available in FHA cases, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 5, at § 10:4, it has mainly been used to challenge
exclusionary land-use decisions and has rarely been applied in rental cases.
Among the few rental cases using this theory are: Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Associates, 736 F.2d 983, 986-88 (4th Cir. 1984); Langlois v. Abington Housing
Authority, 234 F. Supp.2d 33, 55-70 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Boyd v. Lefrak
Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting this theory in a rental case).
257. Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 3, 42-43.
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Lawrence's
challenge
by
examining
how
implicit-bias
discrimination contributes to workplace inequality and may be
countered. 28 Their basic conclusion has been to advocate that
courts and employers dismantle "structural" impediments that bar
minorities and women from achieving job parity, an effort that has
been described as the "second generation" of the legal fight against
employment discrimination.29 As insightful as much of this work
is with respect to the problems posed by implicit bias, its advocacy
of a new structural approach to workplace discrimination law faces
daunting problems, perhaps the most serious of which is the
courts' resistance to expanding Title VII doctrine beyond
situations involving intentional discrimination.
The problems seem even more daunting with respect to rental
discrimination.
Here, blatant racial discrimination remains
widespread, suggesting that even the "first generation" of FHA
work has yet to be accomplished.2 6' Even as to subtle forms of
discrimination, the structural solutions proposed in the
employment context (e.g., greater use of the discriminatory impact
theory and of affirmative action programs) are not generally
transportable to the rental market, because of its domination by
small, local providers who often personally evaluate applicants on
an individual basis rather than by applying broad-based objective
standards. 62
Furthermore,
the
structural
approach
in
258. For a review of this literature, see id. at 4-20.
259. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second GenerationEmployment Discrimination:
A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). Proposals offered by
the Title VII structuralists for dealing with implicit-bias discrimination
include a greater reliance on the discriminatory impact doctrine, on
affirmative action and anti-harassment programs, and on challenging
employer processes that facilitate subtle forms of discrimination.
See
Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 15-20; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 242,
at 979-80, 984-85, 987-88 (describing research suggesting that affirmative
action programs can reduce implicit bias and its discriminatory effects in
employment).
260. Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 3-4, 21-26, 40-41. Thus, Professor
Bagenstos's ultimate conclusion with respect to the structuralists' suggested
solutions is that they make sense less as a call for new legal doctrine than as a
call for new politics of workplace quality. Without such a new politics, it is
doubtful that the doctrinal proposals that have emerged from the structural
turn will ever have a meaningful effect on employment discrimination. Id. at
47; see also Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective
Rather Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 659 (2003) (arguing
that recent employment scholarship's concentration "on how discrimination is
now more frequently subtle in form rather than overt in nature... has failed
to capture much support either in the courts or in our social conscience, where
we continue to be fixated on overt claims of discrimination").
261. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text; supra notes 85, 119-20,
122.
262. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (concerning small
providers' dominance of the rental market); supra notes 246, 248 (concerning
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employment has generally focused on how employees are dealt
with after they are hired (e.g., harassment issues and the "glass
ceiling" phenomenon),263 whereas the basic discrimination problem
in rentals, as revealed by HUD's national studies, is that
minorities are not accorded equal treatment at the initial inquiry
stage. 264
Still, the work of the Title VII structuralists provides at least
a foundation for approaching the problems of implicit-bias
discrimination.
Such discrimination may be even more
widespread in rental than in employment markets, due to the
former's heavy reliance on decision-makers' spontaneous
judgments. Thus, while the specific solutions offered by this Title
VIi-related work may not be helpful for rental markets, its effort
to confront the problems posed by implicit-bias discrimination
should inspire housing scholars to do the same.
As we undertake this effort, however, we must recognize the
modest role that the FHA may be able to play in dealing with such
discrimination. Thus, to paraphrase Professor Bagenstos, the
appropriate response to implicit-bias discrimination in rental
markets may require less a call for new FHA doctrine than a call
for a new politics of housing equality.265
F. Summary
This foray into social science in search of lessons to help curb
race-based rental discrimination has not been encouraging. First,
we have seen that the deterrence value of FHA litigation must be
questioned, both as a general matter in light of empirical studies
in other areas, as well as the fact that FHA enforcement is not
ever likely to be conducted in a way that its "punishments" will
effectively deter discrimination by landlords. It is also clear that
classical economic theory fails to provide significant insights into
how racial discrimination in rentals can be curbed, and indeed the
more sophisticated behavioralists have identified forces suggesting
that landlords' adherence to their discriminatory practices may be
even harder to discourage than simple self-interest theories imply
(e.g., because of people's "irrational" attachment to the status quo
and their tendency to avoid risk). The psychological studies on
implicit bias are particularly daunting for those who advocate
stronger FHA enforcement as the key to changing landlords'
tendency to discriminate against racial minorities.
Some social science insights, however, do suggest promising
approaches, albeit primarily "non-legal" ones. These stem from
the fact that implicit racial bias generally manifests itself in spontaneous and

"close call" situations).

263. See Bagenstos, supra note 233, at 10-12.
264. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text and Part IV.A.
265. See supra note 260.
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the fact that people generally - and presumably landlords as well
- tend to be more influenced by "positive reinforcements" and also
tend to obey laws more out of a sense of their moral value and
fairness and a desire to adhere to social norms rather than from
the threat of punishment. This suggests that greater attention
should be paid to non-legal sources of encouragement for landlords
to treat all would-be tenants equally. An example might be an ad
campaign emphasizing the patriotic imperative of fair housing by,
for example, featuring military personnel of all races returning
from service in Iraq asking their fellow citizens to end rental
discrimination so that all of their comrades-in-arms can have a
fair shot at the American dream.'
Whatever the specific ideas, we may have to recognize, as
Professor Wax pointed out some years ago in discussing
employment discrimination problems posed by implicit bias, that:
"[Sitereotypical patterns of thought will be eroded, if at all, not
through measures effected at the level of the individual workplace,
but rather through a gradual sea change on multiple cultural
fronts." '67 Or, to quote from a decade-old article providing an
anthropological perspective on a discrimination problem:
This may be an instance in which the law cannot lead but must sit
back and wait for progressive developments in the national culture.
Such developments would presumably have at least two principal
components: a change in consumer awareness and behavior among
the ... minorities who... are being taken advantage of, and a
complementary change among those alleged to be taking advantage.
One can imagine a number of agents for change other than the law.
The press, for example, might take up the issue, leading to an
explosion of public awareness ....

266. Those who are skeptical about the capacity of such campaigns to change
public attitudes might consider how Americans' attitudes have vastly changed
in recent years on subjects such as cigarette smoking in public places and the
use of seatbelts. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 210, at 1132 (arguing
that "[g]overnmental attempts to disseminate information on the health risks
of tobacco consumption might have encouraged the development of a social
norm against smoking"). Of course, race-based attitudes are so powerful in
the United States that the skepticism might be justified. See, e.g., WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON & RICHARD P. TAUB, THERE GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD 161
(2006) (finding, based on detailed studies of four Chicago neighborhoods, that
racial attitudes and hostilities were so powerful that "neighborhoods in urban
America, especially in large metropolitan areas like Chicago, are likely to
remain divided, racially and culturally").
267. Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1196
(1999); see also Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?,

53 UCLA L. REv. 701, 780 (2006) (arguing that an effective response to subtle
workplace discrimination may require "a broader social movement that seeks
to explain how pervasive discrimination remains, and how discrimination
continues to disadvantage... minorities").
268. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 221, at 11.
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CONCLUSION

Race and national origin discrimination in rental housing
remains at alarmingly high levels, virtually unchanged from thirty
years ago and apparently unaffected by decades of litigation under
the Fair Housing Act. This "disease" has continued unabated even
as the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act gave the FHA the most
powerful enforcement scheme among the nation's civil rights laws
and led to thousands more claims and tens of millions of dollars
more in monetary relief. The unmistakable conclusion from this
record is that the deterrent value of FHA litigation for rental
discrimination has been minimal and that something else must be
tried if we are serious about providing equal opportunity to the
next generation of Americans, a generation that will include an
unprecedented number of minority renters.
This is not to advocate an end to FHA litigation. There is
evidence that such litigation has had some positive effect in other
areas, such as sales discrimination. Even as to rentals, FHA
litigation presumably has some value. Without it, discrimination
rates might have actually increased. Plus, FHA rental litigation
at least transfers some wealth from discriminating landlords to
their victims and keeps alive the story of America's shameful
record of racial discrimination in housing.269
But if we truly want to end, or even substantially lower, the
rates of race-based discrimination in rental housing, we must look
beyond FHA litigation. Even a cursory awareness of modern social
science principles shows why.
The FHA's "punishment" of
recalcitrant landlords is sporadic and often weak and delayed,
which means that even prejudiced landlords are unlikely to be
much deterred by its threat. More importantly, a large amount of
rental discrimination against racial minorities may be the result of
unconscious bias by landlords who do not see themselves as
prejudiced. To change this behavior will require efforts beyond
simply more rigorous enforcement of the FHA's intent-based
nondiscrimination commands.
One lesson from Title VII scholars who have advocated a
"structural" approach to employment bias is that we need to focus
on, and learn more about, the "supply side" of rental
discrimination. Why not, for example, simply ask landlords why
they discriminate?27 ° The data produced by HUD's national
269. See also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 242, at 980 (noting that
"antidiscrimination law.., has some effect on the level of implicit bias
[because it] naturally tends to increase population diversity in these entities
[e.g., housing complexes]").
270. See L. A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court, Social Change, and Legal
Scholarship, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1615, 1641 (1992) (arguing that effective legal
scholarship concerning social change requires not only dealing with social
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studies could be used to identify landlords who have violated or
obeyed the FHA. HUD has allowed use of this data for private
enforcement efforts directed against sales discrimination.27 ' I am
not here suggesting a similar enforcement effort with respect to
landlords (although it is puzzling why HUD has not pursued
rental, as well as sales, enforcement, given the fact that rental
discrimination is a more widespread problem). My suggestion is
simply that we use the HUD data - or some other appropriate
targeting information - to try to learn more about why landlords
behave as they do and thereby to find better ways of influencing
their behavior. For example, it would be interesting to determine
how professional rental agents managing large apartment
complexes see their antidiscrimination duties compared with
"Mom-and-Pop" landlords.
Finally, on a broader scale, fair housing advocates must
realize that much of what we seek depends on American society
embracing less divisive attitudes in matters of race. This does not
mean we should simply wait passively and accept whatever trends
in racial attitudes occur. It is important - as a fair housing
matter - to constantly oppose negative media portrayals of racial
minorities and to offer positive alternative images. 72 Similarly,
pointing out the benefits of interracial associations must be part of
our advocacy, which particularly means supporting integrated
communities and opposing residential segregation, both through
FHA suits and other means. 3
The fact that this may require a long and difficult struggle
some four decades after enactment of the FHA may be frustrating,
but it is not a reason to avoid making the effort. The potential
science data, but also "other easy steps such as asking living individuals why
they think they acted as they did").
271. As a follow-up to its 2000 study, see supra note 6 and accompanying
text, HUD contracted with the National Fair Housing Alliance to do further
testing and take appropriate enforcement action against some of the sales
offices whose conduct during the 2000 testing process had revealed
discriminatory steering practices. See 2006 TRENDS, supra note 75, at 4
(reporting on the HUD-NFHA contract and some of the resulting complaints
filed against real estate offices in Detroit, Atlanta, Chicago, and Westchester
County, New York).
272. See, e.g., Remarks of Professor Robert Ellickson in THE FAIR HOUSING
ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS, supra note 187, at 61 (suggesting, at a fair
housing conference, with respect to the then-popular Bill Cosby television
show which featured an upper-middle class black family, that "i[t] is possible
that someone like Bill Cosby will do more for fair housing than will all the
lawyers in this room put together").
273. See, e.g., YINGER, supra note 13, at 218 (noting the important "role
played by public rhetoric about race relations and discrimination... [on]
actual outcomes" and suggesting that "national leaders could have a
significant positive impact on race relations in this country with a regular
series of strong public statements against racial and ethnic prejudice and
discrimination").
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rewards for a future generation of American home seekers are too
important not to strive for a better "cure" than simply continued
FHA litigation.

